O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org.

sexta-feira, 28 de abril de 2017

Quem quer estudar os judeus nas Americas? Bolsa da Universidade da Florida. Aproveitem!

Jews in the Americas: A Visiting Research Fellowship at the University of Florida
The Alexander Grass Chair in Jewish History and the Isser and Rae Price Library of Judaica at the University of Florida are pleased to invite applications for short-term research fellowships during the 2017-2018 academic year. Researchers studying different aspects of the Jewish experience in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the southern regions of the United States from the sixteenth century until present day will have the opportunity to spend a maximum period of a month researching in the Price Library. They will have access to the other special and area studies collections of the University of Florida and other library services. Recipients will be expected to deliver a public talk and/or seminar at UF during or after their research visit which will be recognized with an honorarium payment. Recipients of the fellowship will be invited to return and participate in a conference on the Jewish experience in the Americas during fall 2018.
The Price Library was founded in 1981 and is located in the Department of the Special and Area Studies Collections of the George A. Smathers Library at the University of Florida. Today it holds about 110,000 items and its online collections include over 180,000 digital pages. This diverse collection, which offers in-depth insights into numerous fields of research within Jewish studies, is considered the foremost Jewish studies research library in the southeastern United States. The Price Library also collaborates closely with UF’s prestigious Florida and Latin American and Caribbean collections, and thanks to a generous Challenge Grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Price Library is now focusing its collecting activities on recording and preserving Jewish history in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Florida. This fellowship program created by the Alexander Grass Chair in Jewish history aims to help researchers develop new scholarship within these geographical fields based on the Price Library’s holdings.
Preference will be given to advanced graduate students and recent PhDs. We ask applicants to study the Price Library collections and the other UF collections they may want to use during their researchhttp://cms.uflib.ufl.edu/. Please consult the Price Library’s archivesdigital collections, and the materials in UF’s other digital collections, such as the Digital Library of the Caribbean (dLOC), and the Cuban Collection. Applications should not exceed 1000 words and should include the description of the project, and an explanation of how it complements earlier research in the field and what new element it brings to the respective field. Please, indicate the period you plan or prefer to spend in the Price Library. Finally, we ask applicants to attach a CV to their project applications.
We encourage researchers working on themes related to the following topics: migration, community and religious life, institutions (e.g. cemeteries, synagogues); literature in Yiddish, Spanish, Portuguese, Hebrew; food (production, consumption, cuisine); Sephardi experience in the colonial period, transatlantic connections from the colonial era until today, Jewish presses, memory and commemoration, and antisemitism. Proposals of research conducted on other subjects are equally welcome.
Expenses covered: The Research Fellowship covers long distance and local transportation and lodging. The entire Research Fellowship stipend, including honorarium, transportation and lodging does not exceed $5,000. Deadline of application: June 15, 2017.
Successful applicants will be informed until July 15, 2017.
Please send your application to Rebecca Jefferson at rjefferson@ufl.edu and Katalin Rac at katalin.rac@ufl.edu.
Questions and comments should be sent to the same address.
Contact Info: 
Please send your application to Rebecca Jefferson at rjefferson@ufl.edu and Katalin Rac at katalin.rac@ufl.edu
Contact Email: 

Desemprego continua aumentando no Brasil - ItauMacroeconomica

Os companheiros conseguiram, com a Grande Destruição provocada na economia, causar o maior desemprego de nossa história econômica, e ainda insistem em defender "direitos" trabalhistas da nossa anacrônica legislação laboral.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Desemprego atinge 13,7% no 1o. Trimestre de 2017
 Itaú Macro, 28/04/2017
 
Segundo dados da Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua (PNAD Contínua), a taxa de desemprego nacional atingiu 13,7%, contra 13,2% no trimestre concluído em fevereiro. Usando nosso ajuste sazonal, observamos alta do desemprego que passou de 13,1% para 13,2% em março, vigésima oitava alta consecutiva. Projetamos que a taxa de desemprego continue em alta ao longo deste ano.
A desinflação em curso está levando a aumentos da massa salarial real, apesar da queda da população ocupada.

Taxa de desemprego aumentou 2,8  p.p. ante março de 2016
A taxa de desemprego nacional atingiu 13,7% em março[1], ligeiramente acima da nossa expectativa (13,5%) e em linha com o consenso do mercado. O resultado representa uma alta de 2,8 p.p. ante a taxa de desemprego observada no mesmo período do ano passado (10,9%). Usando nosso ajuste sazonal, houve alta da taxa de desemprego de 13,1% em fevereiro para 13,2% em março. A população economicamente ativa (PEA) subiu 0,1% na margem, e 1,4% ante o mesmo período do ano anterior. A população ocupada recuou 0,1% na comparação mensal e está 1,9% abaixo do mesmo período do ano anterior. O emprego no setor privado com carteira de trabalho (-0,5% ante o mês anterior, após ajuste sazonal) foi o que contribuiu para a redução do emprego total.
A taxa de participação (razão entre a PEA e a População em Idade Ativa) subiu 0,1pp para 61,6% (ajustado sazonalmente) e segue ligeiramente acima da média histórica (61,3%).
Contrações da massa salarial real seguem se atenuando
O rendimento nominal habitual aumentou 1,0% em março (dados ajustados sazonalmente). Na comparação ante o mesmo mês de 2016, o crescimento acelerou de 6,8% para 7,2%.
O salário médio real cresceu 0,8% (após ajuste sazonal), a sexta alta consecutiva na margem e continua sendo beneficiado pela desinflação. Em relação ao mesmo mês do ano anterior, houve alta de 2,3%.
Finalmente, a massa salarial real avançou 0,6% no mês, com a contribuição positiva da desinflação mais do que compensando os efeitos da queda da população ocupada. Na comparação anual, a massa salarial segue melhorando (ver gráfico). Em março, houve alta 0,6% ante o mesmo período do ano anterior (ante -0,3% em fevereiro).
Conclusão 
A PNAD Contínua segue mostrando alta do desemprego, que passou de 13,1% para 13,2% (usando nosso ajuste sazonal), a vigésima sétima alta seguida. Projetamos que esta tendência continue à frente, uma vez que o ciclo de contração da atividade econômica ainda não teve seu impacto completo no mercado de trabalho.

Artur Manoel Passos


[1]Todos os dados da PNAD Contínua são divulgados em médias móveis de três meses

quinta-feira, 27 de abril de 2017

Revista Interesse Nacional: dez anos de debates importantes - Paulo Roberto de Almeida




Acabo de receber o n. 37 (abril-junho de 2017), ano X (DEZ) da revista Interesse Nacional, um outro empreendimento de alta envergadura política, e que combina contribuições de intelectuais, personalidades públicas e representantes diversos da chamada "opinião pública" bem informada, dirigida desde o seu início pelo Embaixador Rubens Antonio Barbosa, conselheiro da FIESP e Diretor do Instituto de Relações Internacionais e Comércio Exterior (IRICE), em São Paulo.

Esse número traz um índice dos últimos cinco anos, no qual descubro, com prazer, que compareci como autor-colaborador em três ocasiões (não sei se colaborei nos primeiros cinco anos da revista, mas contribui, sim, com o texto inicial de apresentação do projeto).
Junto com o próprio Rubens Barbosa, Eugênio Bucci, Renato Janine Ribeiro e José Dirceu (ugh!), fui um dos que mais colaborei com artigos na revista.
Eis os meus artigos: 

 1) Sobre a OEA (justo antes da aventura de Zelaya em Honduras)

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

A OEA e a Nova Geografia Política Latino-americana

O site da Organização dos Estados Americanos anuncia em sua página de apresentação que ela “aproxima as nações do Hemisfério Ocidental com vistas a fortalecer mutuamente os valores democráticos, defender interesses comuns e debater um grande número de temas regionais e mundiais” . A declaração é, retrospectivamente, muito curiosa, tendo em vista a resolução aprovada… Leia o artigo
http://interessenacional.com/index.php/edicoes-revista/a-oea-e-a-nova-geografia-politica-latino-americana/
capa-interesse-nacional-06
Minha ficha da relação de publicados: 

913. “Obsolescência de uma velha senhora?: a OEA e a nova geografia política latino-americana”, revista Interesse Nacional (Ano 2, Número 6, Julho-Setembro de 2009, ISSN: 1982-8497, p. 58-69). Postado no site da revista (link: http://interessenacional.com/index.php/edicoes-revista/a-oea-e-a-nova-geografia-politica-latino-americana/). Relação de Originais n. 2011.

2) Sobre a nossa oposição miserável, na verdade castrada, durante a era lulopetista: 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

A Miséria da Oposição no Brasil Da Falta de um Projeto de Poder à Irrelevância Política?

O cenário político brasileiro: A deterioração democrática Um observador medianamente informado sobre a cena política brasileira da última década seria capaz de reconhecer a conjuntura histórica de transformação que ocorre nas forças dominantes no sistema político. Trata-se de uma evolução gradual, que um analista que trabalhe com as categorias “gramscianas” provavelmente consideraria tratar-se da emergência… Leia o artigo
http://interessenacional.com/index.php/edicoes-revista/a-miseria-da-oposicao-no-brasil-da-falta-de-um-projeto-de-poder-a-irrelevancia-politica/
capa-interesse-nacional-13
Minha ficha da relação de publicados:


3) 

O Renascimento da Política Externa

Ano 9 - número 34
Julho - Setembro 2016 


Minha ficha da relação de publicados:







Denuncia do MPF contra Lula (149 paginas): sirvam-se...

Algum petista vai se recusar a ler as 149 páginas da denúncia?
Afinal de contas, sem saber do que ele é acusado não se pode defendê-lo, não é mesmo?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Podem descarregar aqui: 
http://lavajato.mpf.mp.br/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/DENUNCIALULA.pdf

EXCELENTÍSSIMO SENHOR JUIZ FEDERAL DA 13ª VARA FEDERAL DA SUBSEÇÃO JUDICIÁRIA DE CURITIBA/PR. 
Distribuição por dependência aos autos nº 500661729.2016.4.04.7000/PR e 5035204- 61.2016.4.04.7000/PR
Classificação no e-Proc: Sem sigilo
Classificação no ÚNICO: Sem sigilo

O MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO FEDERAL, por intermédio dos Procuradores da República signatários, no exercício de suas atribuições constitucionais e legais, vem, perante V. Exa., com base nos elementos dos autos em epígrafe e dos demais relacionados, e com fundamento no art. 129, I, da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, oferecer DENÚNCIA em face de

1. LUIZ INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA [LULA], brasileiro, filho de Euridece Ferreira de Melo e de Aristides Inácio da Silva, nascido em 06/10/1945 (70 anos), CPF 070.680.938-68, com residência na Avenida Francisco Prestes Maia, nº 1501, bloco 01, apartamento 122, Santa Terezinha, São Bernardo do Campo/SP;

(...) [vários outros, mais exatamente outros sete...) 

pela prática dos fatos delituosos a seguir expostos.

SUMÁRIO

1. SÍNTESE DA IMPUTAÇÃO, 3
1.1. BREVE RESUMO DO ESQUEMA CRIMINOSO, 5

2. CORRUPÇÃO, 8
2.1. CONTEXTUALIZAÇÃO, 8
Relação entre LULA e JOSÉ DIRCEU, 8
Presidencialismo de coalizão deturpado, 10
Mensalão e Lava Jato: faces de uma mesma moeda,14
LULA no vértice de diversos esquemas criminosos, 18
Caixa geral de propina, 21
Uma complexa engrenagem criminosa a favor de LULA, 28
LULA, JOSÉ DIRCEU e a estruturação do Governo, 29
Nomeação de Paulo Roberto Costa para a Diretoria de Abastecimento, 30
Nomeação de Renato Duque para a Diretoria de Serviços, 33
Nomeação de Nestor Cerveró para a Diretoria Internacional, 35
Mensalão e influência do PMDB na PETROBRAS, 36
Nomeação de Jorge Zelada para a Diretoria Internacional da PETROBRAS, 39
A estruturação de um grande esquema criminoso na PETROBRAS, 40
O grande cartel de empreiteiras,44

2.2. IMPUTAÇÕES DE CORRUPÇÃO ATIVA E PASSIVA, 49
A estrutura montada para os atos de corrupção, 51
A estrutura montada para os atos de corrupção na Diretoria de Abastecimento, 56
A estrutura montada para os atos de corrupção na Diretoria de Serviços, 59
Os contratos que originaram as vantagens indevidas, 63
A ação criminosa de LULA,75
A ação criminosa de LÉO PINHEIRO e AGENOR MEDEIROS, 88

3. DA LAVAGEM DE DINHEIRO, 90
3.1. CRIMES ANTECEDENTES, 90
3.2. DA CORRUPÇÃO E DA LAVAGEM DE DINHEIRO POR INTERMÉDIO DA AQUISIÇÃO, PERSONALIZAÇÃO E DECORAÇÃO DE TRIPLEX NO CONDOMÍNIO SOLARIS NO GUARUJÁ/SP, 94
3.2.1. DA CORRUPÇÃO E DA LAVAGEM DE DINHEIRO POR INTERMÉDIO DA AQUISIÇÃO DE COBERTURA TRIPLEX NO CONDOMÍNIO SOLARIS NO GUARUJÁ/SP, 94
Aquisição do apartamento 141-A e recebimento da cobertura triplex 174-A, 95
Crise financeira da BANCOOP, assunção do Condomínio Mar Cantábrico pelo Grupo OAS e entrega da cobertura triplex 174-A para LULA e MARISA LETÍCIA, 99
 Incremento ou “upgrade” da unidade de LULA e MARISA LETÍCIA no Condomínio Solaris às custas da OAS, 102
Conclusão do “Condomínio Solaris” pelas OAS EMPREENDIMENTOS, 107
A visita para definir a personalização do imóvel para LULA e MARISA, 108
O projeto de personalização do imóvel para LULA e MARISA, 108
A visita para verificar a execução do projeto de personalização do imóvel de LULA e MARISA, 109
O apartamento nunca foi anunciado para venda ou visitado por qualquer outro interessado, 110
Da propina paga e ocultada mediante a aquisição da cobertura triplex 164-A, 111

3.2.2. DA CORRUPÇÃO E DA LAVAGEM DE DINHEIRO POR INTERMÉDIO DO CUSTEIO DE OBRAS DE PERSONALIZAÇÃO DA COBERTURA TRIPLEX DO CONDOMÍNIO SOLARIS,112
Valor recebido indevidamente de LÉO PINHEIRO e lavado mediante a reforma da cobertura triplex 164-A do Condomínio Solaris, 118

3.2.3. DA CORRUPÇÃO E DA LAVAGEM DE DINHEIRO POR INTERMÉDIO DO CUSTEIO DA DECORAÇÃO DA COBERTURA TRIPLEX DO CONDOMÍNIO SOLARIS, 118
Da propina recebida e dos valores lavados mediante a decoração da cobertura triplex 164-A do Condomínio Solaris, 125
Totalização dos valores lavados mediante a aquisição, reforma e decoração da cobertura triplex 164-A do Condomínio Solaris, 125

3.3. PROVA DE AUTORIA, 126
3.4. DOS PAGAMENTOS, COM O PROVEITO DOS CRIMES ANTECEDENTES, DO CONTRATO DE ARMAZENAGEM DE BENS, 132
Valor recebido indevidamente e lavado mediante a armazenagem de bens, 137
3.4.1. PROVA DE AUTORIA,137

4. CAPITULAÇÃO, 138

5. REQUERIMENTOS FINAIS, 139


Satisfeitos, companheiros?
Mas precisa ler com atenção...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Podem clicar aqui:
http://lavajato.mpf.mp.br/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/DENUNCIALULA.pdf

Seminario sobre Internacionalizacao de Negocios - Uniceub (11/05/2017)

A seguir:

quarta-feira, 26 de abril de 2017

A ordem liberal foi deformada? O capitalismo sequestrou a globalizacao? Bobagem de Robert Keohane

O artigo é populista, como os líderes políticos que estão vencendo pleitos eleitorais em diversos países, com destaque para o Reino Unido (Brexit) e EUA (eleição de Trump).
Por causa dessas vitórias, a ordem liberal estaria fraudada? 
Mas que bobagem!
Eles é que estão fraudando a ordem liberal com suas mentiras, sua demagogia política e muito populismo econômico.
Quem for atrás desses líderes idiotas vai se encontrar numa situação pior do que antes, pois eles vão deixar seus países numa situação muito pior do que a anterior ordem liberal (se é que esta existia, o que não acredito, pois todos os governos, TODOS, eram e são socialdemocratas).
Outra afirmação risível, ridícula, estúpida dos autores:
O capitalismo sequestrou a globalização?
Mas quanta bobagem!
O capitalismo mal se sustenta em pé, com tanto intervencionismo estatal, tantas deformações causados por políticas públicas. Ele não tem forças sequer para implementar políticas nacionais em favor da liberdade de mercados -- o que seria sua vocação natural -- quanto mais sequestrar essas forças impessoais embutidas na globalização (que é como a força dos ventos ou as correntes marítimas, as marés). Isto não quer dizer que os capitalistas sejam a favor dos mercados livres, ao contrário, eles gostam de monopólios, carteis, coalizões de interesses, que lhes garantam mercados cativos. Mas a lógica do capitalismo, se ela existe, é a concorrência desenfreada, ou pelo menos deveria ser.
A globalização não é controlada por nenhuma força identificada, sequer por esse monstro metafísico, por esse fantasma marxista que se chama capitalismo, pois ela se processa, basicamente em nível microeconômico -- pela força incontrolada, não controlável, totalmente não coordenada das empresas, dos indivíduos, dos inovadores -- sendo que são os governos que tentam controlá-la em nível macroeconômico, ou os tecnocratas dos grandes organismos econômicos internacionais, que pretendem "disciplinar" a globalização em nível multilateral.
A globalização passa, os cães (nacionais) ladram, mas inutilmente, ou apenas conseguem atrasá-la um pouco, em sua marcha irrefreável para a frente.
Surpreende-me que um intelectual razoável como Roberto Keohane se renda a tanta bobagem. Só pode ser o politicamente correto que está contaminando as universidades americanas e cegando mesmo os professores mais inteligentes, ou supostamente lúcidos.
Coloco o texto aqui para alimentar a discussão, mas a minha opinião já está afirmada acima.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 26/04/2017

The Liberal Order Is Rigged

Fix It Now or Watch It Wither

By and
Foreign Affairs essay, May-June 2017

Prior to 2016, debates about the global order mostly revolved around its structure and the question of whether the United States should actively lead it or should retrench, pulling back from its alliances and other commitments. But during the past year or two, it became clear that those debates had missed a key point: today’s crucial foreign policy challenges arise less from problems between countries than from domestic politics within them. That is one lesson of the sudden and surprising return of populism to Western countries, a trend that found its most powerful expression last year in the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU, or Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president.
It can be hard to pin down the meaning of “populism,” but its crucial identifying mark is the belief that each country has an authentic “people” who are held back by the collusion of foreign forces and self-serving elites at home. A populist leader claims to represent the people and seeks to weaken or destroy institutions such as legislatures, judiciaries, and the press and to cast off external restraints in defense of national sovereignty. Populism comes in a range of ideological flavors. Left-wing populists want to “soak the rich” in the name of equality; right-wing populists want to remove constraints on wealth in the name of growth. Populism is therefore defined not by a particular view of economic distribution but by a faith in strong leaders and a dislike of limits on sovereignty and of powerful institutions. 
Such institutions are, of course, key features of the liberal order: think of the UN, the EU, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and major alliances such as NATO. Through them, the Washington-led order encourages multilateral cooperation on issues ranging from security to trade to climate change. Since 1945, the order has helped preserve peace among the great powers. In addition to the order’s other accomplishments, the stability it provides has discouraged countries such as Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
This peace-building aspect of the liberal order has been an extraordinary success. So, too, is the way in which the order has allowed the developing world to advance, with billions of people rising out of crippling poverty and new middle classes burgeoning all over the world. But for all of the order’s success, its institutions have become disconnected from publics in the very countries that created them. Since the early 1980s, the effects of a neoliberal economic agenda have eroded the social contract that had previously ensured crucial political support for the order. Many middle- and working-class voters in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere have come to believe—with a good deal of justification—that the system is rigged. 
Those of us who have not only analyzed globalization and the liberal order but also celebrated them share some responsibility for the rise of populism. We did not pay enough attention as capitalism hijacked globalization. Economic elites designed international institutions to serve their own interests and to create firmer links between themselves and governments. Ordinary people were left out. The time has come to acknowledge this reality and push for policies that can save the liberal order before it is too late.
THE BOATS THAT DIDN'T RISE
In 2016, the two states that had done the most to construct the liberal order—the United Kingdom and the United States—seemed to turn their backs on it. In the former, the successful Brexit campaign focused on restoring British sovereignty; in the latter, the Trump campaign was explicitly nationalist in tone and content. Not surprisingly, this has prompted strong reactions in places that continue to value the liberal order, such as Germany: a poll published in February by the German newspaper Die Welt found that only 22 percent of Germans believe that the United States is a trustworthy ally, down from 59 percent just three months earlier, prior to Trump’s victory—a whopping 37-point decrease.
The Brexit and Trump phenomena reflect a breakdown in the social contract at the core of liberal democracy: those who do well in a market-based society promise to make sure that those disadvantaged by market forces do not fall too far behind. But fall behind they have. Between 1974 and 2015, the real median household income for Americans without high school diplomas fell by almost 20 percent. And even those with high school diplomas, but without any college education, saw their real median household income plummet by 24 percent. On the other hand, those with college degrees saw their incomes and wealth expand. Among those Americans, the real median household income rose by 17 percent; those with graduate degrees did even better. 
The Brexit and Trump phenomena reflect a breakdown in the social contract at the core of liberal democracy.
As political scientists such as Robert Putnam and Margaret Weir have documented, such trends have led to different sets of Americans living in separate worlds. The well-off do not live near the poor or interact with them in public institutions as much as they used to. This self-segregation has sapped a sense of solidarity from American civic life: even as communications technology has connected people as never before, different social classes have drifted further apart, becoming almost alien to one another. And since cosmopolitan elites were doing so well, many came to the conclusion—often without realizing it—that solidarity just wasn’t that important for a well-functioning democracy. 
Elites have taken advantage of the global liberal order—sometimes inadvertently, sometimes intentionally—to capture most of the income and wealth gains in recent decades, and they have not shared much with the middle and lower classes. Wealthier, better-educated Americans have pushed for or accepted regressive tax policies, trade and investment agreements that encouraged corporate outsourcing, and the underfunding of public and higher education. The result of such policies has been to undermine what the political scientist John Ruggie once called “embedded liberalism”: a global order made up of free-market societies that nevertheless preserved welfare states and labor-market policies that allowed for the retraining of people whose skills became obsolete, compensation for those who lost out from trade liberalization, and validation of the self-worth of all citizens, even if they were not highly productive in economic terms. Elites pushed for and supported the first part of this vision—free markets, open borders, and multilateralism—but in the 1970s and even more so in the 1980s, they began to neglect the other part of the bargain: a robust safety net for those who struggled. That imbalance undermined domestic support for free trade, military alliances, and much else. 
The bill for that broken social contract came due in 2016 on both sides of the Atlantic. And yet even now, many observers downplay the threat this political shift poses to the liberal order. Some argue that the economic benefits of global integration are so overwhelming that national governments will find their way back to liberalism, regardless of campaign rhetoric and populist posturing. But the fact is that politicians respond to electoral incentives even when those incentives diverge considerably from their country’s long-term interests—and in recent years, many voters have joined in the populist rejection of globalization and the liberal order. 
Moreover, business leaders and stock markets, which might have been expected to serve as a brake on populist fervor, have instead mostly rewarded proposals for lower taxes with no accompanying reduction in government spending. This is shortsighted. Grabbing even more of the benefits of globalization at the expense of the middle and working classes might further undermine political support for the integrated supply chains and immigration on which the U.S. economy depends. This position is reminiscent of the way that eighteenth-century French aristocrats refused to pay taxes while indulging in expensive foreign military adventures. They got away with it for many years—until the French Revolution suddenly laid waste to their privilege. Today’s elites risk making a similar mistake.

CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR
Some portion of the blame for the liberal order’s woes lies with its advocates. Policymakers pursued a path of action favored by many academics, including us: building international institutions to promote cooperation. But they did so in a biased way—and, for the most part, we underestimated the risk that posed. Financial firms and major corporations enjoyed privileged status within the order’s institutions, which paid little attention to the interests of workers. WTO rules emphasized openness and failed to encourage measures that would cushion globalization’s effects on those disadvantaged by it, especially workers in the traditional manufacturing sectors in developed countries. Meanwhile, investment treaties signed in the 1990s featured provisions that corporate lawyers exploited to favor big business at the expense of consumers. And when China manipulated trade and currency arrangements to the disadvantage of working-class Americans, Washington decided that other issues in U.S.-Chinese relations were more important, and did not respond strongly. 
Working-class Americans didn’t necessarily understand the details of global trade deals, but they saw elite Americans and people in China and other developing countries becoming rapidly wealthier while their own incomes stagnated or declined. It should not be surprising that many of them agreed with Trump and with the Democratic presidential primary contender Bernie Sanders that the game was rigged. 
Much ink has been spilled on the domestic causes of the populist revolt: racism, growing frustration with experts, dysfunctional economic policies. But less attention has been paid to two contributing factors that stemmed from the international order itself. The first was a loss of national solidarity brought on by the end of the Cold War. During that conflict, the perceived Soviet threat generated a strong shared sense of attachment not only to Washington’s allies but also to multilateral institutions. Social psychologists have demonstrated the crucial importance of “othering” in identity formation, for individuals and nations alike: a clear sense of who is not on your team makes you feel closer to those who are. The fall of the Soviet Union removed the main “other” from the American political imagination and thereby reduced social cohesion in the United States. The end of the Cold War generated particular political difficulties for the Republican Party, which had long been a bastion of anticommunism. With the Soviets gone, Washington elites gradually replaced Communists as the Republicans’ bogeymen. Trumpism is the logical extension of that development.
In Europe, the end of the Cold War was consequential for a related reason. During the Cold War, leaders in Western Europe constantly sought to stave off the domestic appeal of communism and socialism. After 1989, no longer facing that constraint, national governments and officials in Brussels expanded the EU’s authority and scope, even in the face of a series of national referendums that expressed opposition to that trend and should have served as warning signs of growing working-class discontent. In eastern Europe, anti-Soviet othering was strong during the 1980s and 1990s but appears to have faded as memories of the Cold War have become more distant. Without the specter of communist-style authoritarianism haunting their societies, eastern Europeans have become more susceptible to populism and other forms of illiberalism. In Europe, as in the United States, the disappearance of the Soviets undermined social cohesion and a common sense of purpose.
The second force stirring discontent with the liberal order can be called “multilateral overreach.” Interdependence requires countries to curb their autonomy so that institutions such as the UN and the World Bank can facilitate cooperation and solve mutual problems. But the natural tendency of institutions, their leaders, and the bureaucracies that carry out their work is to expand their authority. Every time they do so, they can point to some seemingly valid rationale. The cumulative effect of such expansions of international authority, however, is to excessively limit sovereignty and give people the sense that foreign forces are controlling their lives. Since these multilateral institutions are distant and undemocratic—despite their inclusive rhetoric—the result is public alienation, as the political scientist Kathleen McNamara has documented. That effect is compounded whenever multilateral institutions reflect the interests of cosmopolitan elites at the expense of others, as they often have. 
SYSTEM UPDATE
Derigging the liberal order will require attention to substance but also to perceptions. The United States has made only feeble attempts to sustain something like Ruggie’s embedded liberalism, and even those attempts have largely failed. Germany, Denmark, and Sweden have done better, although their systems are also under pressure. Washington has a poor track record when it comes to building government bureaucracies that reach deep into society, and the American public is understandably suspicious of such efforts. So U.S. officials will have to focus on reforms that do not require a lot of top-down intervention. 
To that end, Washington should be guided by three principles. First, global integration must be accompanied by a set of domestic policies that will allow all economic and social classes to share the gains from globalization in a way that is highly visible to voters. Second, international cooperation must be balanced with national interests to prevent overreach, especially when it comes to the use of military force. Third, Washington should nurture a uniquely American social identity and a national narrative. That will require othering authoritarian and illiberal countries. Fostering U.S. opposition to illiberalism does not mean imposing democracy by force, but it does require more than occasional diplomatic criticism of countries such as China or Saudi Arabia. A willing president could, for instance, make it clear that although the United States may have an interest in cooperating with nondemocratic countries, it identifies only with liberal democracies and reserves its closest relationships for them. Done properly, that sort of othering could help clarify the American national identity and build solidarity. It might at times constrain commercial relationships. However, a society is more than just an economy, and the benefits of social cohesion would justify a modest economic cost. 
Like it or not, “America first” is a powerful slogan.
Developing policies that satisfy those principles will require innovation and creativity. Some promising ideas include tax credits to businesses that provide on-the-job training for dislocated workers and earned-income tax credits for individuals. Progressives have pursued such policies in the past but in recent times have retreated or compromised for the sake of passing trade deals; they should renew their commitment to such ideas. Officials should also require that any new trade deals be accompanied by progressive domestic measures to assist those who won’t benefit from the deals. At a minimum, Congress should avoid regressive tax cuts. If, for example, the Trump administration and its GOP allies in Congress decide to impose a border adjustment tax on imports, the revenue raised ought to benefit the working class. One way to make that happen would be to directly redistribute the revenue raised by the tax on a per capita basis, in the form of checks to all households; that would spread the wealth and build political support for the combination of economic openness and redistribution. Another way to benefit the working class would be to stimulate job creation by lowering employers’ payroll tax burden. Such ideas will face an uphill battle in the current U.S. political environment, but it is essential to develop plans now so that, when political opportunities emerge, defenders of the liberal order will be ready.
The more difficult task will be developing a national narrative, broadly backed by elites across the ideological spectrum, about “who we are”—one built around opposition to authoritarianism and illiberalism. The main obstacle will likely be the politics of immigration, where the tension between cosmopolitanism and national solidarity surfaces most clearly. Cosmopolitans argue (correctly) that immigrants ultimately offer more benefits than costs and that nativist fears about refugees are often based more on prejudice than fact. The United States is a country of immigrants and continues to gain energy and ideas from talented newcomers. Nonetheless, almost everyone agrees that there is some limit to how rapidly a country can absorb immigrants, and that implies a need for tough decisions about how fast people can come in and how many resources should be devoted to their integration. It is not bigotry to calibrate immigration levels to the ability of immigrants to assimilate and to society’s ability to adjust. Proponents of a global liberal order must find ways of seeking greater national consensus on this issue. To be politically sustainable, their ideas will have to respect the importance of national solidarity. 

Like it or not, global populism has a clear, marketable ideology, defined by toughness, nationalism, and nativism: “America first” is a powerful slogan. To respond, proponents of an open liberal order must offer a similarly clear, coherent alternative, and it must address, rather than dismiss, the problems felt keenly by working classes. For Democrats, “the party of jobs” would be a better brand than “the party of increasing aggregate welfare while compensating the losers from trade.”
Without dramatic change to their messages and approach, established political parties will fade away altogether. An outsider has already captured the Republican Party; the Democrats are cornered on the coasts. In Europe, the British Labour Party is imploding and the traditionally dominant French parties are falling apart. To adapt, establishment parties must begin to frame their ideas differently. As the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has argued, progressives must learn to speak of honor, loyalty, and order in addition to equality and rights. 
To derig the liberal order and stave off complete defeat at the hands of populists, however, traditional parties must do more than rebrand themselves and their ideas. They must develop substantive policies that will make globalization serve the interests of middle- and working-class citizens. Absent such changes, the global liberal order will wither away.

Roberto Campos: materia no Jornal do Senado (18/04/2017)

Eis a ficha do trabalho e de sua repercussão:


3102. “Sessão especial no Senado em homenagem a Roberto Campos”, Brasília, 10 abril 2017, 3 p. Texto lido na sessão especial do dia 17/04/2017. Divulgado antecipadamente no blog Diplomatizzando (16/04/2017; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2017/04/roberto-campos-sessao-especial-no.html), e no Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks/posts/1493626460700799). Vídeo da sessão disponível no YouTube (26/04/2017; link: https://youtu.be/XobuvjMuy7k). Notas no Jornal do Senado (ano XXIII, n. 4680, 18/04/2017, p. 1, 6-7). Relação de Publicados n. 1255.






Historia da Literatura Ocidental - Otto Maria Carpeaux: disponivel

Uma oportunidade a não perder, para quem não tem a edição impressa da monumental obra do grande intelectual austríaco, naturalizado brasileiro, Otto Maria Carpeaux (nome afrancesado a partir do original em alemão), um dos maiores conhecedores da literatura universal, em especial a ocidental.


Resumo

Apresentada em quatro alentados volumes, esta é uma das mais importantes obras publicadas no Brasil no século XX. A Folha de S.Paulo, no final do século passado, reuniu especialistas para escolher as cem melhores obras de não-ficção do século XX e a História da literatura ocidental de Carpeaux alcançou o 18.º lugar.
No primeiro volume, Otto Maria Carpeaux (Viena, 1900-Rio de Janeiro, 1978) parte da Antiguidade greco-latina, percorre as expressões literárias da Idade Média e analisa o Renascimento e a Reforma. No segundo volume, faz a exegese do Barroco e do Classicismo, analisa a poesia, o teatro, a epopeia e o romance picaresco, entre outros temas e autores, tais como Cervantes, Góngora, Shakespeare e Molière. Ainda no segundo volume, continua o estudo do neobarroco, do Classicismo racionalista, do Pré-Romantismo, os enciclopedistas e o que chama de “o Último Classicismo”. O terceiro tomo refere-se à literatura do Romantismo até nossos dias. Nele está incluído o Romantismo brasileiro, o que contribui para o entendimento de autores brasileiros como José de Alencar, Castro Alves e Álvares de Azevedo, além de Machado de Assis na sua fase cunhada de “romântica”. Ainda nesse terceiro volume, estão o Realismo e o Naturalismo e seu espírito de época: Balzac, Eça, Tolstói, Zola, Dostoiévski, Melville, Baudelaire, Machado, Aluísio Azevedo, Augusto dos Anjos, entre tantos autores, aqui são estudados para expressar um período de grande transformação social com o aparecimento do marxismo e das lutas sociais mais politizadas. O quarto volume traz extensa análise sobre a atmosfera intelectual, social e literária do fin du siècle oitocentista e o surgimento do Simbolismo naquilo que o autor chama de “a época do equilíbrio europeu”. E, por fim, depois de enveredar pelas vanguardas do século XX e de fazer esboço das tendências contemporâneas, o autor austro-brasileiro encerra sua obra, monumental não somente pela extensão e abrangência de autores e estilos de época, mas também pela verticalidade com que analisa e aprofunda cada época, autor e assunto. Elogiada por Antonio Candido, Drummond, Álvaro Lins, Aurélio Buarque de Holanda e outros intelectuais e escritores, a História da literatura ocidental de Otto Maria Carpeaux é definitiva, enciclopédica e multidisciplinar, fundamental na bibliografia literária e cultural brasileira. Vol. 107A: CXLIV + 542 páginas; Vol. 107B: 816 páginas; Vol. 107C: 732 páginas; Vol. 107D:796 páginas 

Baixe o livro em pdf: http://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/handle/id/528992