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Mostrando postagens com marcador Alvaro Vargas Llosa. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Alvaro Vargas Llosa. Mostrar todas as postagens

quinta-feira, 7 de agosto de 2014

Imigracao nos EUA: uma obsessao historica - livro de Alvaro Vargas Llosa

Breaking Through the Partisanship of Broken Borders
Dispelling the Myths on Immigration


The flood of children crossing the U.S.-Mexico border has rekindled an already heated immigration debate, but will it prompt politicians to make major changes to the nation's immigration laws? Or will they play it safe as midterm elections approach, and hope that immigration issues somehow resolve themselves? And what exactly should immigration policy look like in a free society?

In a defining approach to the hotly debated issue of immigration reform, the award-winning book Global Crossings, by Independent Institute Senior Fellow Alvaro Vargas Llosa, examines the immigrant experience and explores who migrants are, why they move, and who benefits. And as this powerful story unfolds, Vargas Llosa offers reforms that stand as a powerful and humane solution to the flawed plans being offered by politicians.

Global Crossings:Immigration, Civilization, and America
By Alvaro Vargas Llosa

A native of Peru who has lived and worked on three continents, renowned author Vargas Llosa has written an insightful analysis of the cultural, economic, and political ramifications of immigration—one the most enduring phenomena of the human story.

Part historical treatise and part politico-economic analysis—and sprinkled with fascinating anecdotes from his personal experience around the world—Global Crossings is a far-reaching book that will captivate anyone curious about the drama inherent in the age-old quest to make a better life by moving abroad and about the government policies that often thwart that effort.
PROSE Honorable Mention Award for Best Book (Association of American Publishers)
2014 Bronze Medal IPPY Award Winner
2014 Benjamin Franklin Silver Award (Independent Book Publishers Association)

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Praise for Global Crossings:

"Alvaro Vargas Llosa's timing is as superb as his book, which lands smack in the middle of a feverish Washington debate over America's most recent arrivals . . . What recommends Global Crossings is that it offers a thoughtful critique of the restrictionists from the standpoint of a fellow conservative."
—The Wall Street Journal

"This compelling book is a must read for anyone on the vital yet contentious issue of immigration. Global Crossings puts a personal face on the issue, superbly arguing that restrictions on the basis of accident of birthplace have no economic or social justification, and in the hands of government are a dangerous infringement on individual liberty and human well-being."
—Daniel L. McFadden, Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences; E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley

"Using facts, history, logic and his own personal experiences, Alvaro Vargas Llosa vividly demonstrates why immigration is almost always economically, culturally and morally beneficial. Global Crossings is an essential and highly readable, even riveting, tour de force."
—Richard K. Vedder, Distinguished Professor of Economics, Ohio University

Alvaro Vargas Llosa is Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute. He has been a nationally syndicated columnist for the Washington Post Writers Group and among his Independent Institute books, Liberty for Latin America received the Sir Anthony Fisher International Memorial Award and Lessons from the Poor: Triumph of the Entrepreneurial Spirit was awarded the Templeton Freedom Award. Former op-ed page editor at the Miami Herald, he has written for the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, BBC World Service, Time, and other media, and he has been named Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

quinta-feira, 6 de março de 2014

Venezuela: o homem mais perigoso do pais (para os totalitarios e seus companheiros)

Gracias a Orlando Tambosi
Quem é Leopoldo López, o "homem mais perigoso" da Venezuela
Álvaro Vargas Llosa, do Instituto Independiente, escreve sobre o homem que, hoje preso, é tido tido pela ditadura chavista como seu principal inimigo. Virtudes demais, sob um brutal regime nacional-socialista conduzido a ferro e fogo pelo apedeuta Nicolás Maduro:

Tras varios días en la clandestinidad, Leopoldo López, uno de los líderes del movimiento de resistencia de Venezuela, se entregó durante una masiva manifestación de protesta y proclamó: “Si mi encarcelamiento sirve para que el país despierte, ha valido la pena”.

La dictadura chavista encabezada por Nicolás Maduro lo ha acusado de actos de violencia relacionados con las recientes protestas. En realidad, como múltiples testimonios y una gran cantidad de pruebas gráficas lo demuestran, la violencia ha sido perpetrada por los grupos paramilitares, conocidos como “colectivos”, que el gobierno ha armado y ensalzado como protectores de la revolución bolivariana.

Estas milicias son similares a las que el gobierno cubano emplea rutinariamente contra sus críticos. No debería ser una sorpresa. Cuba participa activamente con el régimen venezolano y ha jugado un papel preponderante en el diseño y operación del aparato de seguridad. Los lazos de Maduro con La Habana se remontan a la década de 1980, cuando fue entrenado en la tristemente célebre Escuela Superior del Partido Comunista, también conocida como “Ñico López”. Desertores de los servicios de inteligencia han indicado que él ha tenido estrechas relaciones con el Departamento América de Castro, encargado de propagar la revolución por toda América Latina.

¿Por qué es tan peligroso Leopoldo López? Por varias razones.

1. Él no tiene miedo. El mundo lo ha descubierto recientemente, pero los venezolanos lo han sabido desde hace bastante tiempo.

2. Aunque su linaje se remonta a la lucha independentista de Bolívar, no tiene conexión con las cuatro décadas que antecedieron a la llegada al poder de Chávez—conocidas como “puntofijismo” después del Pacto de Punto Fijo suscripto en 1958 por los principales partidos políticos y asociado en la mente de los partidarios del gobierno con la corrupción y un profundo abismo social. El régimen de Chávez ha construido su legitimidad revolucionaria sobre la demonización del período democrático, el “antiguo régimen” que se suponía que Venezuela dejaría atrás. Pero López, que tiene sólo 42 años, saltó a la fama junto con otros líderes jóvenes, incluido Henrique Capriles—el hombre que encabezó la oposición en las fraudulentas elecciones del año pasado—como miembro de Primero Justicia, una nueva organización política en la época en la cual el difunto Chávez llegó al poder.

3. Durante varios años, López fue más popular que Chávez a pesar de que era el alcalde de un pequeño municipio de Caracas. Temiéndolo como un potencial contendiente, el gobierno le prohibió ocupar cargos políticos. El vacío en la oposición fue llenado por Capriles. Pero López fue Capriles antes de Capriles.

4. López es un sobreviviente, una condición poco común en un hombre de sus raíces sociales si usted ve el mundo a través del lente de la lucha de clases. Aunque la maquinaria chavista fue capaz de hacer a un lado al oponente entrenado en Harvard despojándolo de sus derechos, ante el asombro de Maduro López sigue en marcha, convertido ahora en un icono del movimiento de resistencia desde suprisión militar de Ramo Verde.

5. Él ha demostrado un sentido de la épica, una cualidad política más usualmente asociada a la izquierda en América Latina. No hay movimiento de resistencia exitoso sin una narrativa épica. López la está escribiendo.

6. Él también posee un sentido de la estética política. Walter Benjamin habló de la estetización de la política en un contexto diferente. La secuencia que se inició con las protestas del 14 de febrero y terminó con las emotivas imágenes de López entregándose será legendaria. Vestido de blanco, sosteniendo una bandera y algunas flores, el héroe, padre de dos niños pequeños, se despidió con un beso de su esposa en medio de un mar de simpatizantes y posteriormente se entregó a los matones de la Guardia Nacional, quienes lo empujaron brutalmente dentro de un vehículo blindado.

Para los venezolanos amantes de la libertad, esas imágenes serán el equivalente al día, en 1992, cuando un desconocido teniente coronel, Hugo Chávez, apareció en la televisión después de su fallido golpe de Estado contra el presidente Carlos Andrés Pérez y anunció que sus objetivos no habían sido alcanzados “por el momento”.

7. López ha entendido que la presión en las calles, la resistencia civil pacífica, es indispensable en la lucha contra la tiranía. Razón por la cual, junto con la diputada María Corina Machado y el alcalde de Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, se ha embarcado en lo que él llama “la salida” con el fin de forzar una transición al Estado de Derecho. Para Maduro y sus patrocinadores cubanos este es un problema importante. Amenaza su estrategia, diseñada para perpetuar el régimen quitándole toda esperanza de cambio a los millones de víctimas tras quince largos años de populismo autoritario. Ellos desean que los críticos venezolanos se conviertan en lo que los disidentes cubanos son actualmente—un grupo de individuos inmensamente heroico pero políticamente impotente al cual el gobierno no tiene problema alguno en abrumar cuando se vuelve demasiado ruidoso.

Maduro y los cubanos tienen razón: López es un tipo peligroso.

sexta-feira, 27 de setembro de 2013

Bolivarianos: o corredor autoritario da America Latina - Alvaro Vargas Llosa (Veja 45 Anos)

VEJA 45 anos

O corredor autoritário

Financiada pelo dinheiro do petróleo, a “revolução bolivariana”, liderada pelo venezuelano Hugo Chávez, expandiu o populismo na América Latina - e evidenciou a fragilidade da liderança brasileira na região

Álvaro Vargas Llosa
AGENDA DE DESPACHOS - Chávez no Palácio de Miraflores, em Caracas (2002): pretextos para virar a mesa das instituições democráticas
AGENDA DE DESPACHOS - Chávez no Palácio de Miraflores, em Caracas (2002): pretextos para virar a mesa das instituições democráticas    (Lindsey Addario)

UM PROJETO DE DESESTABILIZAÇÃO

12 de março de 2008

Principal patrocinador político e financeiro das Forças Armadas Revolucionárias da Colômbia (Farc), o então presidente venezuelano Hugo Chávez (1954-2013) disparou uma série de ameaças contra o governo de Álvaro Uribe depois que este ordenou um ataque aéreo contra um acampamento dos terroristas instalado na selva equatoriana. No bombardeio, acabou morto o segundo nome na hierarquia da organização, Raúl Reyes, de quem o líder venezuelano era amigo. Todo o barulho feito por Chávez em cima do episódio, destacou VEJA, tinha um só objetivo: promover uma escalada militar na região. Os avanços da Colômbia na guerra contra o narcoterrorismo minavam o projeto de desestabilização dos governos democráticos do continente alimentado por Chávez.
TRECHO: “Sob a fachada da solidariedade bolivariana, Chávez busca estabelecer relações de dependência com os vizinhos. Na Bolívia, ele financiou a carreira de seu clone, Evo Morales. Rafael Correa é grato pelo petróleo equatoriano que a Venezuela refina a preços camaradas. (...) Chávez identifica na Colômbia o maior obstáculo a seu plano de expansão da revolução bolivariana, especialmente na América do Sul. O país é uma democracia, usufrui economia próspera e se tornou aliado-chave dos Estados Unidos. (...) A Colômbia é exatamente o contrário de tudo aquilo que Chávez acredita e defende.”
Com a chegada de Hugo Chávez ao poder, nasceu a nova variante do autoritarismo latino-americano. Conhecida como “revolução bolivariana” e “socialismo do século XX”, ela tem quatro características: a revolução como pretexto para derrubar as instituições republicanas; a receita energética, sistema que, em vez de aumentar a produção das riquezas do subsolo, as descapitaliza e malbarata na conquista de clientelas eleitorais; a compra de in-fluên-cias externas para estender seu modelo aos muitos países que optaram pela via razoável; e, por último, a intenção de fazer da China um salva-vidas internacional que resolva todos os seus problemas.
Durante alguns anos, a sorte pareceu sorrir para o populismo de Venezuela, Equador, Bolívia, aliados íntimos, e Argentina, um amigo próximo. Isso se deveu à bonança das commodities e ao uso de ingressos fiscais extraordinários (1,4 bilhão de dólares desde 1999 na Venezuela) para melhorar a qualidade de vida de uma ampla clientela social e política no curto prazo.
A Venezuela viu o preço do petróleo subir de 8 dólares o barril para três dígitos e utilizou 1 de cada 4 dólares das vendas do gigante petrolífero PDVSA para fazer populismo. A Bolívia, graças ao gás, que só requeria abrir as válvulas, viu sua arrecadação fiscal triplicar em sete anos (os Estados Unidos precisaram de quarenta anos para triplicar a sua). Assim como a Venezuela, a Bolívia pôs parte dessa bonança a serviço do populismo. Alguns países populistas, como a Argentina, registraram nesses anos, graças à soja e aos grãos, taxas de crescimento econômico de 8% em média. Não estranha, portanto, que, nos anos que precederam o fim da bolha mundial, nesses países da esquerda carnívora se registrasse uma queda da pobreza.
Mas a miragem acabou. A elevação meteórica dos gastos públicos, o aumento artificial da demanda, as expropriações e o ambiente agressivo contra o capital, a insegurança jurídica permanente e a retórica antiempresarial incendiária, tudo isso no contexto de uma ofensiva contra a democracia, só poderiam conduzir aos resultados que vemos hoje: inflação, desequilíbrio das finanças do estado, descapitalização da economia, taxas de crescimento muito fracas e muita corrupção.
A produção de petróleo da Venezuela passou de 3,5 milhões de barris diários para 2,6 milhões. O Equador produz 40 000 barris a menos por dia e a Bolívia viu evaporar metade das reservas de gás natural, equivalentes a 4% de seu PIB, em parte desde a nacionalização. A arrecadação fiscal desses países já não consegue financiar seu populismo.
O investimento privado foi a pique e, com ele, a taxa de investimento geral. Na Bolívia, hoje, a principal fonte de investimento é o estado: o investimento público é muito superior ao investimento privado nacional, que não chega a 5% do PIB, e ao estrangeiro. No Equador, o valor do investimento estrangeiro acumulado caiu 40% durante o atual governo. A economia argentina, com escassíssimo investimento externo, cresceu apenas 2% no total em 2012. Para compensar a fuga de capitais e a queda acelerada das reservas, a Argentina estabeleceu controles que não eram vistos na América Latina desde Salvador Allende no Chile. O resultado de tudo isso é o sofrimento dos proletários e o fortalecimento dos grupos de poder próximos dos governos: no caso da Venezuela, a “boliburguesia”.
Mas as consequências do populismo “bolivariano” não são apenas as que estes povos padecem. Elas atingiram também a região em seu conjunto. Eu diria que foram três.
Primeiro, a submissão política de vários governos dependentes do petróleo venezuelano, o que se refletiu nos organismos hemisféricos, a começar pela Organização dos Estados Americanos, onde a influência chavista foi desproporcional. A aliança entre Venezuela e Cuba controlou a política exterior de dezoito países por meio do mecanismo Petrocaribe, que permite ao Caribe e à América Central adquirir petróleo muito barato, e da Alba (Aliança Bolivariana para os Povos da Nossa América).
A segunda consequência: tornou-se muito difícil para as nações em melhor situação, como as da Aliança do Pacífico (México, Chile, Colômbia e Peru), exportar seu modelo para a região. Agora que o boom das matérias-primas terminou, as implicações são evidentes: muitos países da região não estão preparados para o que vem aí. Isso para não mencionar que a batalha pela democracia liberal sofreu um retrocesso.
A terceira consequência: a fragilidade da liderança do Brasil na América Latina (por sua vez, o vazio deixado pelo país ajudou a facilitar a projeção excessiva dos “bolivarianos”). Lamentavelmente, a potência sul-americana não quis assumir a liderança para promover um consenso regional sobre as benesses da democracia, da economia de mercado e da globalização. Brasília preferiu deixar que os países governados pela esquerda radical tivessem a iniciativa regional. Agora é tarde porque o Brasil se desacelerou economicamente e perdeu parte do brilho internacional que tinha.
Como outras modas autoritárias, a dos “bolivarianos” passará. Mas sua contribuição para o subdesenvolvimento de vários países não deve ser esquecida.
Álvaro Vargas Llosa, peruano, é escritor e jornalista, autor de numerosos livros sobre economia política. Foi nomeado Jovem Líder Global pelo Fórum Econômico de Davos e eleito pela revista Foreign Policy um dos cinquenta intelectuais mais influentes da Ibero-América em 2012
Para ler outras reportagens, baixe gratuitamente a edição comemorativa de VEJA no IBA ou no tablet.

sábado, 9 de fevereiro de 2013

O fim da esquerda latino-americana? - Alvaro Vargas Llosa


The End of the Latin American Left

Will Hugo Chávez's revolution die with him?

BY ALVARO VARGAS LLOSA 

Foreign Policy, February 7, 2013

The exact condition of Hugo Chávez continues to be a Churchillian riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. The Venezuelan president, who won his third reelection last October and has been hospitalized in Cuba for many weeks with cancer, missed his own inauguration in January. In his absence, Vice President Nicolás Maduro, Chávez's hand-picked successor, has been left in charge of the government indefinitely. But Maduro is no Chávez, lacking both the charisma and the power base of Venezuela's mercurial leader. And it's not just a problem for the chattering classes in Caracas: The question haunting the Latin American hard left, which Chávez has dominated in the last decade, is who will take his place.
In explaining the rise of the political left in Latin America over the past decade, Chávez's persona looms large. Politicians like Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Chávez for laying the groundwork toward a renewed form of populism, Latin America's version of socialism. Chávez's illness has only served to highlight that debt. "The issue of the health of brother Chávez is a problem and a worry not just of Venezuela, but of all the anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist people," Morales said in January, speaking from behind a podium reading, "We Are All Chávez." But Chávez's charisma and ruthless political genius fail to explain why he has been able to achieve such regional clout. Through a canny use of petrodollars, subsidies to political allies, and well-timed investments, Chávez has underwritten his Bolivarian revolution with cash -- and lots of it. But that effective constellation of money and charisma has now come out of alignment, leaving a power vacuum that will be difficult for Chávez's political heirs across the hemisphere to fill.
Several Latin American leaders would like to succeed him, but no one meets the necessary conditions: Cuba's blessing, a fat wallet, a country that carries enough demographic, political and economic weight, potent charisma, a willingness to take almost limitless risks, and sufficient autocratic control to allow him or her to devote major time to permanent revolution away from home.
What will happen is partly in Cuba's hands. Because Cuba has made Venezuela into its foreign-policy proxy, the Castro brothers need Caracas to remain the capital of the movement for it to retain any vitality. While Cuba is dependent on the roughly 100,000 barrels of heavily subsidized oil Chávez's regime supplies to Cuba daily, the island nation has a grip on Venezuela's intelligence apparatus and social programs. Chávez himself acknowledged last year that there are almost 45,000 Cuban "workers" manning many of his programs, though other sources speak of an even larger number. This strong connection allows Cuba to exercise a vicarious influence over many countries in the region. Caracas's clout in Latin America stems from Petrocaribe, a mechanism for helping Caribbean and Central American countries purchase cheap oil, and ALBA, an ideological alliance that promotes "21st century socialism." The combination of the two gives Caracas, and therefore Havana, some authority over the politics of 17 other countries.
What does this mean for the future of the left? Essentially that Cuba will do its utmost to prop up Maduro. Chávez's chosen man will never be a revered figure -- his talents as a politician are lackluster -- but with Havana's backing and control of the money funneled to the region's leaders, he will retain some of Chavez's stature. In recent months, he and what might be called the civilian nucleus of the Venezuelan government have been a constant presence in Havana, where they have relied on the information supplied to them by Cuba about Chávez's real condition. This clique is comprised mainly of Rosa Virginia, Chávez's eldest daughter; her husband Jorge Arreaza, who is also a minister; Cilia Flores, Maduro's wife and the prosecutor general of the regime; and, finally, Rafael Ramírez, the head of the oil giant PDVSA.
Maduro has made most of his key political announcements from Havana, often flanked by some of these people as a way to consolidate his legitimacy inside the Venezuelan military, where he has rivals, and of course the Latin American left writ large. It seems to have worked for now: The region's left lent him dutiful support through various regional bodies when the opposition denounced the arrangements that have turned him into an acting president indefinitely. In a statement put out by Secretary General José Miguel Insulza, the Organization of American States supported the constitutional arrangements in Venezuela in the wake of Chavez´s absence -- and incurred the ire of MUD, the united opposition.
Critical in all of this is the money at Maduro's disposal. The sales of PDVSA, the state-owned oil cash cow, amounted to $124.7 billion in 2011, of which one-fifth went to the state in the form of taxes and royalties, and another fourth was channeled directly into a panoply of social programs. This kind of management makes for very bad economics, a reason why the company needs to resort to debt to fund its basic capital expenditures, and for decreasing productivity, but it remains crucial for the regime and the Latin American left. Funding social programs at home and subsidizing oil shipments abroad, as well as giving cash to various foreign entities, is in good part what makes Caracas the epicenter of the left. Consequently, the support Maduro enjoys from Cuba and the money at his disposal offsets his lack of Chávez-like charisma.
Although Venezuela's current economic debacle has had a debilitating effect on the system described above, as has Chávez's ill health, China has helped mitigate the impact. The China Development Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China have lent Caracas $38 billion to fund some social programs, a bit of infrastructure spending, and purchases of Chinese products and services. Another $40 billion has been promised to fund part of the capital expenditures needed to maintain the flow of oil committed to Beijing. The oxygen provided by Beijing gives Caracas some ability to grease the regional machinery despite the domestic crisis.
Cuba's support for Maduro and his oil money notwithstanding, there will still be a vacuum of sorts at the top of the Latin American left after the vice president takes over from Chávez on a permanent basis -- assuming he is able to consolidate his own power internally and fend off his military rivals. Other Latin American leaders will clearly see an opening at least to enlarge their role if not lead the left outright.
Argentina's Kirchner is already trying. As she has further radicalized in response to an acute economic crisis at home and the rise of an opposition both within the ranks of her party and among the large middle class, in looking for a major Latin American role she has departed from traditional Peronismo. In the last year, she has made her country's claim to the Falkland Islands, now under British control, a focal point of her foreign policy, obtaining explicit support at Mercosur (the South American common market) and UNASUR (the Union of South American Nations). Until recently, she limited her rapport with Caracas to business and occasional gestures rather than ideology -- Buenos Aires sold sovereign bonds to Caracas a few years ago and was later able to import fuel cheaply and sign trade deals. Now she makes trips to Havana too and has raised her voice in denouncing the usual imperialist suspects -- certain liberal democracies, foreign investors, international courts, and the IMF. By adopting this tone, she hopes to rally the base at a difficult time. She is currently barred from seeking reelection in 2015 but is aiming to change the constitution to allow her to seek another term, a move laden with certain Chávismo overtones.
There are, however, limits to her potential role as a leader of the Latin American left. The most important one is economic. The statist, populist Argentine model is now bankrupt. Economic growth was minimal in 2012, a year that also saw record inflation and the expansion of capital controls to prevent a stampede of dollars. This would not be an insurmountable political obstacle were it not for the fact that a majority of Argentineans are now opposed to her -- her approval rating is down to 30 percent -- and that her own party is fractured. It is one thing to fight the "fascist right" as the head of a united Peronista front. But it is quite another for Kirchner to be denounced more stridently by her leftist base than by the center-right. Apart from the fact that she lacks the funds to finance regional revolution -- despite running the largest populist economy in Latin America -- Kirchner can ill afford to devote her attention to foreign matters. Last but not least, Argentina is too large and too proud a country for it to accept near-subordination to Cuba, a key condition for leading the Latin American rebels.
What about Bolivia's Morales? Given the symbolism of his indigenous roots, he seems a strong prospective candidate. But he is geographically too far from Havana -- Chávez´s constant pilgrimages to Cuba would be hard for Morales to replicate. He too has mounting problems at home, where his social and political base is now severely split. Unlike Chávez, who has been able to group his different supporters under a socialist umbrella organization, Morales's party, MAS, has become isolated from the myriad social movements that once backed him and now claim he is not delivering on promises of social justice. His main fights have not been with the right but with these organizations, which have paralyzed the country at various times.
Like other populists, Morales has some cash at his disposal through the sale of natural resources. But private investment is tiny in Bolivia, and Morales has doubled the proportion of the economy directly under government control. Because he needs to pour resources into populist economic programs to keep his enemies at bay, Morales cannot afford to fund foreign adventures. In fact, his need for cash is forcing him to charge Kirchner, a close ally, about four times more for Bolivia's natural gas than the going rate in Argentina's own gas-producing region, the Neuquen Basin. Lastly, Bolivia's economy is tiny, amounting to just 8 percent of Venezuela's.
Correa, who as president of Ecuador heads an oil-producing country, is another possibility. He certainly has the ambition and is the intellectual alpha male of the pack. His inevitable reelection this month will give him renewed vigor. But his country produces five times less oil than Venezuela and, with an economy less than a fifth the size, is in no position to command leadership regionally. After tripling government spending since he came to power in 2007, Correa's coffers face a fiscal deficit of 7.7 percent of GDP. And because it defaulted on part of the national debt in 2008, Ecuador is barred from capital markets. If not for the $7 billion-plus lifeline China has thrown Correa in advance payments for oil and credits, the country's financial situation would be dire. Given that 80 percent of Ecuador's oil exports have been pledged as guarantee against these loans, Correa would never be able to subsidize other countries.
That leaves Brazil, the single most powerful Latin American country and a symbol of ideological moderation that may well hold the key to the destiny of the Latin American left -- if only it wanted to. Until now, Brazil has deliberately given Chávez the space to play a disproportionate role in the neighborhood. Since former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had Marxist roots and a radical base to please, he made up for his responsible domestic policies by tolerating, and sometimes encouraging, Chávez's leadership of the regional left. In foreign policy, Lula preferred to spend his time cementing ties with the other BRIC countries and collecting allies in Africa, partly with a view to building up support for a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council. The rest was spent cozying up to the United States's adversaries, including Iran, and proposing solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian question (an initiative for which he teamed up with Turkey).
Dilma Rousseff, the current Brazilian president and Lula's political heir, has moderated her country's foreign policy but is conscious of the fact that her overbearing predecessor and the party base want close relations with the left. This is a major reason for having kept Marco Aurélio Garcia, a man umbilically connected with the regional populists, as a foreign policy advisor.
But Dilma is not personally interested in leading Latin America's left. Her country's main economic tool in Latin America, the Brazilian development bank BNDES, funds mostly domestic companies investing in the region, not other governments, and its disbursements in Latin America totaled a mere $1 billion last year. An initiative for integrating South America's infrastructure led by Brazil, known as IIRSA, lacks a political or ideological imprint. Dilma also confronts an economic challenge that Lula was spared. Growth has stalled (it barely cracked 1 percent last year), and some serious soul-searching is underway about why the emerging star of the last decade is now facing the prospect of a mediocre future if new reforms are not undertaken.
All of this points to the Cuba-Venezuela connection continuing to play a pivotal role through Maduro. That said, Maduro will have considerably less ability to project influence than when Chávez was at the helm. Presumably, the vacuum partially left by Chávez will see various forces vying for an increased role, including Kirchner as the radicalized Peronista running the largest populist economy, while Morales and Correa, as well as Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega, call attention to themselves without the necessary power to back their chutzpah. Brazil will arbitrate among these leftists and wait to see what emerges before throwing its lot with anyone.
With no viable leader to take up Chávez's mantle, the future portends disarray for the Latin American left. Fearful that this may spell the end of the movement, there is but one miracle the left can cling to -- that Chávez finds a way to rise from his Havana deathbed.
LEO RAMIREZ/AFP/Getty Images
 
Alvaro Vargas LLosa is senior fellow at the Independent Institute. His new book, Global Crossings: Immigration, Civilization and America, will be published in June.

quarta-feira, 1 de junho de 2011

Nao confie em Premios Nobel, nenhum: eles tambem sao malucos...

Pois é, até mesmo Vargas Llosa, que eu considera um ser pensante, minimamente racional, derrapou feio nessa questão das escolhas eleitorais no Peru...
Amor próprio consegue ser maior que a razão...
Motivo para um bom romance, talvez...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Vargas Llosa rompe con el diario peruano 'El Comercio' por favorecer a Keiko Fujimori
EL PAÍS | Madrid 31/05/2011

El escritor cancela su colaboración con el periódico, al que tacha de manipulador

El escritor Mario Vargas Llosa ha solicitado hoy a EL PAÍS que deje de enviar su columna dominical Piedra de toque al diario peruano El Comercio, al que acusa de "manipular la información" y haberse convertido en una "máquina propagandística de la candidatura de Keiko Fujimori".

El premio Nobel de literatura apoya al candidato presidencial Ollanta Humala, a quien considera un mal menor ante la posibilidad de que gobierne el país Keiko Fujimori, hija del expresidente Alberto Fujimori, actualmente en prisión por delitos contra los derechos humanos y corrupción.

Tras solicitar el cese de sus colaboraciones con El Comercio, el novelista ha remitido una carta al director del diario, Francisco Miró Quesada, y a varios medios de Perú, en la que explica por qué había solicitado a EL PAÍS, titular de los derechos sobre sus artículos dominicales, que cancelasen sus colaboraciones con El Comercio.

"Desde que un puñado de accionistas, encabezados por la señora Martha Meier Miró Quesada, tomó el control de ese diario y del grupo de canales de televisión y periódicos de que es propietario, el periódico se ha convertido en una máquina propagandística de la candidatura de Keiko Fujimori que, en su afán de impedir por todos los medios la victoria de Ollanta Humala, viola a diario las más elementales nociones de la objetividad y de la ética periodísticas: silencia y manipula la información, deforma los hechos, abre sus páginas a las mentiras y calumnias que puedan dañar al adversario a la vez que en todo el grupo de medios se despide o intimida a los periodistas independientes, y se recurre a las insidias y golpes bajos de los peores pasquines que viven del amarillismo y del escándalo. No puedo permitir que mi columna Piedra de toque siga apareciendo en esa caricatura de lo que debe ser un órgano de expresión genuinamente libre, pluralista y democrático", advierte Vargas Llosa en su misiva dirigida al director de la publicación y de la que se han hecho eco varios medios de Lima, y a la que ha tenido acceso EL PAÍS.

Vargas Llosa añade finalmente que se aparta del diario El Comercio "por segunda vez y de manera definitiva".

Fuentes del grupo mediático El Comercio indicaron a El PAÍS que su diario ha publicado hasta ahora todas las columnas de Vargas Llosa, incluso en las que abogaba expresamente por el voto por Humala.

Las últimas encuestas electorales, publicadas el domingo, reflejaban una pugna muy reñida entre ambos candidatos y daban una ligera ventaja de entre uno y tres puntos a Fujimori. Otra encuesta, de la empresa Imasen, publicada por el diario La República, le otorgaba ventaja a Humala, por lo que la incertidumbre se mantendrá.