O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador China. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador China. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 19 de abril de 2024

Timothy Snyder sobre a guerrilha de mentiras conduzida por ditaduras como China e Rússia - 17/04/2024

 

Political Warfare and Congress

My Testimony from 17 April

The essence of “political warfare,” in the sense defined by the Chinese communist party, is that Beijing uses media, psychology, and law to induce adversaries to do things counter to their own interests. 

Political warfare works through you or it does not work. So if you are not willing to think about yourself, you are not thinking about political warfare.

I had the honor of testifying to Congress on the question of Chinese political warfare this past Wednesday, April 17th. This testimony was before the Oversight Committee, which has devoted months of time, money, and attention to an impeachment inquiry which is based on a mendacious claim by a man in contact with Russian intelligence services. 

That congressional impeachment inquiry, based on a Russian fabrication, then became the subject of Chinese propaganda tropes, designed to spread the lie that President Biden took a bribe. This false notion, generated by Moscow, can only be spread by Beijing because there are Americans in the middle, American elected officials, who do their part. 

A hearing on political warfare in Congress, and especially before this particular committee, requires self-reflection. 

The hearing had some moments of interest, many of which are circulating as clips. Feel free to post your favorites in the comments.

The below text is my formal written testimony, which you can find in with all the notes and references on the congressional website. Video of my opening remarks is here. The entire session can be viewed here.

white concrete building under cloudy sky during daytime

•••

Testimony to Oversight Committee, “Defending America from the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Warfare, Part I”

Professor Timothy Snyder, 17 April 2024

Democracy is in decline, dragged down by the autocratic lie. The autocrats offer no new visions; instead they lie about democracies and insert lies into democracies. The test of disinformation is its power to alter the course of crucial events, such as wars and elections.

Russia undertook a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the basis of a big lie about Nazis.

Even as we meet today, Russian (and Chinese) propaganda shapes House debates about Ukraine, the most important foreign policy decision of our time. In domestic politics, the most important matter in coming months the coming presidential election.

To begin with the war. Beijing cares about Ukraine because it is the decisive conflict of our time. It can spread lies about Ukraine thanks to prior Russian labor. Beijing wrongly blames the war on Washington. Chinese information actions seek to attract American actors around to Russian propaganda tropes meant to justify Russian aggression and bring about American inaction.

Though Americans sometimes forget this, Ukrainian resistance is seen around the world as an obvious American cause and an easy American victory. So long as Ukraine fights, it is fulfilling the entire NATO mission by itself, defending a European order based in integration rather than empire, and affirming international order in general. It is also holding back nuclear proliferation.

Given these obvious strategic gains, American failure in Ukraine will lead other powers to conclude that a feckless and divided United States will also fail to meet future challenges. The fundamental goal of Russian (and thus Chinese) propaganda is to prevent American action, thereby making America seem impotent and democracy pointless -- also in the eyes of Americans themselves.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is intimately connected to a possible Chinese war of aggression against Taiwan. As Taiwanese leaders continually and urgently remind us, Ukrainian resistance deters Chinese aggression. Ukraine deters China in a way that the United States cannot, without taking any action that Beijing could interpret as provocative. A Russian victory in Ukraine, therefore, would clear the way for Chinese aggression in the Pacific. It would strengthen China's ally, force Europe into a subordinate relationship to

Beijing, and discredit democracy. It would also bring into Russian hands Ukrainian military technologies that would be significant in a Chinese war of aggression.

Russia's one path to victory in Ukraine leads through minds and mouths in Washington, DC. Russian and Chinese propaganda therefore celebrates the inability of Congress to pass aid for Ukraine, and praises those who hinder the passage of such a bill. But the specific propaganda memes that China spreads (and some American leaders repeat) about the war are of Russian origin. Russia is the leader in this field; China is imitating Russian techniques and Russian tropes.

A central example is the Russo-Chinese invocation of "Nazism." Russian began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine with the grotesque claim that its aim was the "denazification" of Ukraine. (Ukraine is a democracy with freedom of expression, assembly and religion, which elected a Jewish president with more than 70% of the vote. Russia is a one-party state with a leader cult that is fighting a criminal war and suppressing all domestic opposition.) This "Nazi" meme was immediately boosted by the Chinese government. Over the weekend before this hearing, a Member of Congress tweeted this Russian disinformation trope.

The Russian war of destruction in Ukraine is the pre-eminent test of democracy; U.S. elections come next. Russia is also the leader here.  China has has no Paul Manafort.  It lacks American human assets with experience in directing foreign influence campaigns and close to American presidential campaigns. Nothing China has done (as yet) rivals the Russian hacking of the Democratic National Committee in 2016.

On social media, CCP propaganda demeans the Biden administration. But China's social media campaign on behalf of Trump in 2024 looks like a copy (a poor one) of Russia's on behalf of Trump in 2016. CCP propaganda invokes the false charges raised in impeachment hearings, but the lies that China magnifies arose from a person in contact with Russian intelligence. What China can do is try an influence campaign based on a Russian initiative -- and American impeachment hearings. Insofar as this works at all, it is a cycle: Russia-America-China -- with the Chinese hope that the propaganda it generates from Russian initiatives and American actions will cycle back to distress Americans and hurt the Biden administration.

The CCP's internet propaganda is posted on X (Twitter). Likewise, Russia's denazification meme did not need a Russian or a Chinese channel to reach Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene. Nor did she need a Russian or Chinese platform to spread the disinformation trope further. She and her American followers used X (Twitter).

Marjory Taylor Greene is not the only member of Congress to have presented the Russian "denazification" trope in public debate. In the case of Matt Gaetz, we know that the transmission belt was Chinese, because he cited a Chinese state propaganda source in congressional debate.

It is not clear in what sense X is an American platform; in any event, its owner, Elon Musk, has removed prior safeguards identifying state propaganda outlets, driving much higher viewing of Russian and Chinese propaganda.  Under Musk, X (Twitter) has been particularly lax in policing known Chinese propaganda accounts, ignoring their flagging by government and other platforms. Musk has also personally spread specific Russian propaganda tropes.

Russian lies are meant not only to disinform, to make action more difficult, but also to demotivate, to make action seem senseless. Russian memes work not by presenting Russia as a positive alternative, but by demoralizing others. No one wants to be close to "Nazis," and the simple introduction of the lie is confusing and saddening.

The same holds with the Russian meme to the effect that Ukraine is corrupt. A completely bogus Russian source introduced the entirely fake idea that the Ukrainian president had bought yachts. Although this was entirely untrue, Representative Greene then spread the fiction. Senator J.D. Vance also picked up the "yacht" example and used it as his justification for opposing aid to Ukraine.

The larger sense of that lie is that everyone everywhere is corrupt, even the people who seem most admirable; and so we might as well give up on our heroes, on any struggle for democracy, or any struggle at all. Ukraine's president, Volodymr Zelens'kyi, chose to risk his life by remaining in Kyiv and defending his country against a fearsome attack from Russia which almost all outsiders believed would succeed within days. His daring gamble saved not only his own democracy, but opened a window of faith that democracies can defend themselves. It confirmed the basis lesson of liberty that individual choices have consequences. The lie directed at Zelens'kyi was meant not only to discredit him personally and undermine support for Ukraine, but also to persuade Americans that no one is righteous and nothing is worth defending.

Insofar as legislators such as Marjorie Taylor Greene and J.D. Vance are vectors of propaganda, they are themselves playing a part of the Russian (or Russo-Chinese) operation. As such they are not merely spreading fictions; they are also modelling a "Russian" style of government, a politics of impotence, in which big lies are normal, corruption is thought to be routine, and nothing gets done. Russian lies about Ukraine are meant to prevent action to help Ukraine; but in a larger sense they are also meant to spread the view that those in power are incapable of any positive action at all.

When legislators embrace Russian lies, they demobilize the rest of us, conveying the underlying notion that all that matters is a clever fiction and a platform from which to spread it. A first step legislators can take is to cease to spread known propaganda tropes themselves. Russian (or Russo-Chinese) memes work in America when Americans choose to repeat them.

Republican leaders quite properly raise concerns about Russian memes in the Republican mouths. The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have warned in recent weeks that Russian disinformation has shaped the views of Republican voters and the rhetoric of Republican elected officials. Representative Michael R. Turner said that "We see directly coming from Russia attempts to mask communications that are anti-Ukraine and pro-Russia messages — some of which we even hear being uttered on the House floor."

For this and other reasons, the problem cannot be dismissed as "foreign." Elite American actors such as Congressional representatives and billionaires know what they are doing when they spread Russian memes. Most Americans, however, confront them unknowingly.

From the perspective of Russia (and China), all social media platforms present an attack surface. Non-Chinese platforms are the main vectors of Russian and disinformation. During the 2020 presidential election, for example, the largest Facebook group for American Christians was run by people who were neither. While ByteDance/TikTok is important, it is less so than Twitter and Facebook. Social media as such favors hostile interventions over locally reported news. During the 2020 presidential election, for example, the main Facebook site for American Christians was run by people who are neither.

ByteDance/TikTok is an attractive target for legislation, but a ban on TikTok unaccompanied by other policy will have limited effects. It will not prevent China from carrying out influence operations in the United States, nor would it stop China from gathering information on American citizens. To hinder Russian (and Chinese, and other) operations, all platforms would have to be regulated.

In the contest between authoritarian and democratic regimes, it will ultimately be not just self-defense but creative initiative that defines and saves the democracies. The era of hostile disinformation is also the era of the decline of reporting, and the two phenomena are linked. An American who has access to reporting will be less vulnerable to disinformation, and better able to make navigate the demands of democratic citizenship. A victory over disinformation will be won in a climate in which Americans have access to reliable information and reasons to trust it.


segunda-feira, 15 de abril de 2024

China Continues To Dominate An Expanded BRICS - Alicia Garcia-Herrero (East Asia Forum)

 Nada de muito novo…

China Continues To Dominate An Expanded BRICS – Analysis 

By 

By Alicia Garcia-Herrero

(…)

BRIC was officially launched in 2009 and was renamed BRICS in 2010 when South Africa joined the group. Since then, trade relations have clearly grown, but in a very unbalanced manner.

Most of the growth in trade has been China-centric, with the contribution from the rest of BRICS remaining quite flat until recently. The recent increase is mostly explained by India, which has experienced an acceleration in economic growth. BRICS members are increasingly intertwined with China as far as trade is concerned, but the remaining members have very few ties among themselves. Bilateral trade between BRICS members other than China remains extremely low.

China’s sheer economic size — five times greater than India’s — and China’s increasing assertiveness in foreign policy explain China’s dominance of BRICS. BRICS countries have increasingly similar positions to China at the United Nations. This is not only the case for issues within China’s sphere, such as Xinjiang-related resolutions, but also more global issues such as resolutions on the invasion of Ukraine and the Israel–Palestine crisis.

The  only exception on Ukraine has been Brazil, which voted in line with the West in March 2022. But Brazil’s diplomatic stance on Ukraine has become much more blurred since then and its position has fully aligned with China’s on the conflict in Gaza.

China has been the leading proponent of expanding BRICS to BRICS+. The main reason for expansion was to make BRICS more representative of the developing world and give it a stronger voice on the global stage.

But the six countries invited to join — which has become five after Argentina’s withdrawal — are quite heterogenous. Some are net creditors (such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), while others are net debtors and in a very weak financial position. Half of them are large exporters of fossil fuels (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran). Ethiopia and Egypt stand out as members from Africa, a continent that has become increasingly important for China’s and India’s foreign policy.

The questions that arise are what BRICS can achieve with such a heterogeneous group of members, and whether it will be able to maintain its objectives after expansion.

The group has called for comprehensive reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to make the institutions more representative, accountable and effective in addressing global challenges. BRICS has also consistently advocated for comprehensive reform of the United Nations, arguing that its current structure with five permanent members holding veto power does not represent the interests of all member states.

One increasingly important objective of BRICS is to become the new platform for developing countries to voice their concerns and interests. The international financial architecture is an area where members’ positions can clearly be aligned. BRICS promotes the use of local currencies in trade between its member states, especially in trade with China, as well as supporting rules-based, open and transparent global trade. The expansion of its membership evidently supports this objective.

The actual impact of BRICS expansion will depend on several factors, including the group’s ability to overcome its internal challenges and the response of the West. Still, the smooth expansion is a clear sign that the global balance of power is shifting and that developing countries are playing an increasingly important role in global affairs.

How BRICS will fare over time depends on several factors. First and foremost is how China’s power evolves. There is increasing consensus that China’s long-term growth will continue to decelerate, which will reduce the opportunities that the Chinese market has to offer for BRICS members and others. A second important factor is how BRICS members and their populations come to perceive China.

The heterogeneity of BRICS is not only economic but also political. The elephant in the room is India, which finds itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position in groupings that are dominated by China. Still, the group’s diversity and its members’ respective comparative advantages could turn out to be a boon not only for China but also for India.

BRICS, which started as a primarily economic initiative to mark the transfer of economic power to the emerging world, has grown into an important geopolitical grouping. China’s centrality and the diversity of its members present both challenges and opportunities.

The future of the grouping is uncertain, given its heavy economic dependence on China and the deteriorating sentiment towards China among its members. India’s fast growth and increasing geopolitical heft create additional challenges for the continuation of a China-centric BRICS.

  • About the author: Alicia Garcia-Herrero is Senior Research Fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel and Adjunct Professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
  • Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum. A version of this article was first published here in EconPol Forum.


sábado, 13 de abril de 2024

Como a Tesla, de Elon Musk, plantou na China as sementes de sua própria queda - The New York Times

Como a Tesla, de Elon Musk, plantou na China as sementes de sua própria queda

 

Instalação de fábrica em Xangai foi fundamental para salvar montadora americana de crise, mas também ajudou a impulsionar a indústria chinesa de carros elétricos

 

Por The New York Times

 

 — Nova York

 

10/04/2024 

 

Quando o bilionário americano Elon Musk instalou na China uma fábrica da Tesla, a fabricante de carros elétricos controlada por ele, fez uma aposta que garantiu à empresa peças e componentes mais baratos e operários qualificados, mas, ao mesmo tempo, pode ter criado a maior ameaça ao futuro de seus negócios, ou seja, a indústria chinesa de veículos elétricos.

 

A aposta salvou a Tesla. Da crise que vivia em meados dos anos 2010, a companhia se tornou a montadora mais valiosa do mundo após as cotações de suas ações dispararem, fazendo de Musk um dos homens mais ricos do planeta, conta a edição desta terça-feira, dia 9, do podcast The Daily, do jornal The New York Times.

 

Alguns anos antes de apresentar os primeiros carros produzidos na fábrica da China, com a Tesla à beira do fracasso, Musk havia apostado no gigante asiático em busca de peças baratas e trabalhadores capazes. Nos primeiros anos de atividade, a montadora americana enfrentava atrasos no desenvolvimento dos carros e desconfiança de investidores.

 

A China, por sua vez, precisava da Tesla como uma âncora para impulsionar sua incipiente indústria de veículos elétricos. Para os líderes chineses, uma fábrica da Tesla em solo doméstico era um prêmio.Inicialmente, Musk parecia ter a vantagem na relação, garantindo concessões da China que raramente eram oferecidas a empresários estrangeiros, mas a Tesla agora está cada vez mais em apuros, perdendo sua vantagem sobre os concorrentes chineses no próprio mercado que ajudou a criar.

 

A mudança de direção da Tesla na China também amarrou Musk a Pequim de uma maneira que está sendo examinada pelas autoridades dos EUA.

 

Entrevistas com ex-funcionários da Tesla, diplomatas e técnicos de governo feitas pelo The New York Times revelam como Musk construiu uma relação simbiótica incomum com Pequim, lucrando com a generosidade do governo chinês enquanto recebia subsídios nos EUA. 

 

Enquanto Musk explorava a construção da fábrica em Xangai, os líderes chineses concordaram com uma mudança crucial na política de regulamentações nacionais de emissões de gases do efeito estufa (GEE), após uma pressão política da Tesla que não foi relatada anteriormente.

 

Essa mudança beneficiou diretamente a montadora americana, trazendo centenas de milhões de dólares em lucros estimados à medida que a produção na China decolava, descobriu o The New York Times.

 

Musk também obteve acesso incomum a líderes de alto escalão do governo chinês. Ele trabalhou em estreita colaboração o primeiro-ministro Li Qiang, quando ele era um importante oficial de Xangai. A fábrica chinesa da Tesla foi construída em velocidade recorde e sem um parceiro local, um feito inédito para uma empresa automobilística estrangeira na China.

 

O bilionário, que já insinuou que os trabalhadores americanos são preguiçosos, aproveitou a unidade chinesa para fugir de problemas com legislações trabalhistas.

 

Em Fremont, na Califórnia, a primeira fábrica da Tesla enfrentou problemas com autoridades e sindicatos por causa de questões trabalhistas. Na China, após a morte de um trabalhador da Tesla em Xangai no ano passado, um relatório citando lacunas de segurança foi retirado do ar.

 

Além disso, Musk obteve a política de emissões de GEEs. Modelada a partir de um programa da Califórnia que tem sido um benefício para a Tesla, a política concede créditos aos fabricantes de automóveis por produzir carros limpos – o Sistema de Negociação de Emissões (ETS, na sigla em inglês) da Califórnia, um dos maiores do mundo, rendeu à Tesla, de 2008 a 2023, US$ 3,7 bilhões, segundo o gabinete do governador local.

 

Para pressionar pela mudança regulatória, a Tesla se aliou a ambientalistas da Califórnia, que estavam tentando limpar os céus poluídos da China e viam na exportação do modelo de ETS a confirmação de seu sucesso. A China introduziu o seu ETS em 2017.

 

Todo esse movimento ajudou a tornar a Tesla a empresa de automóveis mais valiosa do mundo, mas o sucesso da montadora americana por lá também forçou as marcas locais a inovar.

 

A China está agora produzindo carros elétricos baratos, mas bem feitos, enquanto o líder chinês Xi Jinping visa transformar o país em uma “potência automobilística”.

 

Fabricantes de automóveis chineses como BYD e SAIC estão avançando na Europa, ameaçando fabricantes estabelecidos como Volkswagen, Renault e Stellantis – dona das marcas Fiat, Peugeot, Citröen e Jeep. As montadoras americanas, como Ford e General Motors (GM), também estão correndo para acompanhar o ritmo.

 

— Há “antes da Tesla e depois da Tesla” — disse Michael Dunne, consultor automotivo e ex-executivo da General Motors na Ásia, sobre o efeito da empresa na indústria chinesa. — A Tesla foi a faz-tudo.

 

Musk agora está andando na corda bamba. Ele soou o alarme sobre os rivais da China, mesmo permanecendo dependente do mercado e da cadeia de suprimentos chineses e repetindo os pontos de vista geopolíticos de Pequim.

 

O bilionário alertou em janeiro que, a menos que as marcas automobilísticas chinesas fossem bloqueadas por barreiras comerciais, elas “praticamente demoliriam a maioria das outras empresas automobilísticas do mundo”. O preço das ações da Tesla despencou após vendas lentas na China, fazendo Musk perder o título de homem mais rico do mundo.

 

A montadora americana está tão enraizada na China que Musk não pode se desvincular facilmente, caso queira. Os carros da Tesla custam significativamente menos para serem fabricados em Xangai do que em outros lugares, uma economia-chave quando a empresa está em uma guerra de preços com seus concorrentes.

 

No Congresso americano, os legisladores estão estudando seus laços com a China e como ele equilibra a Tesla com seus outros empreendimentos. A SpaceX, outra empresa que ele possui, tem contratos lucrativos com as forças armadas dos EUA e detém quase total controle da internet via satélite do mundo através de sua rede Starlink.

 

Musk também é dono da plataforma de mídia social X, anteriormente Twitter, que a China usou para campanhas de desinformação.

 

— Elon Musk tem uma exposição financeira profunda à China, incluindo sua fábrica em Xangai — disse o senador Mark Warner, democrata da Virgínia, que preside o Comitê de Inteligência do Senado.

 

Na China, não está claro se o governo tentou exercer pressão sobre Musk, mas as autoridades locais têm alavancas que poderiam puxar. No ano passado, várias localidades chinesas proibiram carros da Tesla em áreas sensíveis, levando a empresa a enfatizar que todos os dados chineses são mantidos localmente.

 

Em fevereiro, depois que o Departamento de Comércio dos EUA anunciou uma investigação sobre a retenção de dados pelos veículos elétricos chineses, o Global Times, um jornal do Partido Comunista da China, alertou que os consumidores chineses poderiam retaliar contra a Tesla.

 

Tesla, SpaceX e Musk não responderam a uma lista detalhada de perguntas do The New York Times. Durante um evento do jornal em novembro, Musk disse que “todas as empresas automobilísticas” dependem em parte do mercado chinês. Ele também descartou preocupações sobre SpaceX e Starlink, dizendo que não operam na China e que suas empresas não devem ser confundidas.

 

Por outro lado, em uma conversa online com dois membros do Congresso americano em julho do ano passado, ele foi mais direto. O bilionário reconheceu ter “alguns interesses pessoais” na China e se descreveu como “um pouco pró-China”.


quinta-feira, 7 de março de 2024

Os dez maiores bancos do mundo, 2023

 World's largest banks, 2023.

1. 🇨🇳 ICBC

2. 🇨🇳 China Construction Bank

3. 🇨🇳 Agricultural Bank of China

R. 🇺🇸 Bank of America

6. 🇺🇸 JPMorgan Chase

7. 🇯🇵 Mitsubishi 

8. 🇬🇧 HSBC

9. 🇫🇷 BNP

10. 🇫🇷 Crédit Agricole


(S&P Global Market Intelligence)

quarta-feira, 28 de fevereiro de 2024

Janus.Net special issue on Brazil

 Dear friends and colleagues,


Special Issue 1: Brazil, China and International Relations

Submission of article ready for review by June 2024

 

Brazil is a major economy of Latin America that acts with increasing prominence on the global economic and political stage. Brazil has over 200 million people. It is a member of international groups as diverse as G20, Mercosur and BRICS. Brazil has diversified sectors and abundant natural resources. It continues to be a global leader in the export of agricultural commodities and present promising economic growth indicators. The country has also in recent decades managed to expand its industries and service sector, attracting both domestic and foreign investments. The political landscape of Brazil is a complex one. While the country has witnessed economic growth and social progress, it has also been confronted with major challenges related to social inequality, corruption and political trust. Against this background, JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations will be publishing a special issue that discusses Brazil in a greater context. It is hoped that this initiative will bring together experts and scholars interested in the Federative Republic of Brazil and its international forays, asking what the future holds for emerging partners hailing from as far as the People’s Republic of China.

 

We call for:

  • New approaches for the study of Brazil with a focus on world engagement preparedness
    • Novel epistemologies and conceptualizations that advance our knowledge of Brazil and its preparedness for engagement;
    • Studies of Brazil that address “the modern international” using innovative and unconventional IR methods;
    • Up-to-date studies of Brazil by humanistic social sciences scholars that also pertain to “the modern international”;
    • Studies of Brazil that actively engage with the latest Global South, Feminist and Post-Humanist epistemologies;
  • Studies on Brazil with a focus on Chinese presence, engagement and interests;
  • Studies that highlight the knowledge produced in Brazil / the South Atlantic that is also applicable to our understanding of Chinese action in the world;
  • Studies that advance our understanding of Global China and its global engagement;
  • Studies that put Asian Studies, Latin American Studies, Lusophone Studies and other area studies in conversation;
  • Historicized transcontinental studies of agency and identity that promote greater awareness of world connectivity and interdependence.

Scholars may use qualitative, quantitative and mixed method approaches. They may be interested in different subjects and based in different parts of the world. While we may expect greater interest from International Relations scholars, we are open also to submissions from other members of the learned community. They are expected to place Brazil and its connections with the outside world, especially Asian partners such as China, at the center of their analysisIt is hoped that the special issues will be published in December 2024.

We are looking forward to receiving your valuable contribution!


Francisco José Bernardino da Silva Leandro

Associate Professor with Habilitation - Deputy Director of Institute of Global and Public Affairs - Faculty of Social Sciences -  Department of Government and Public Administration (DGPA) - University of Macau  - E21B Building - Office 4051

Avenida da Universidade – Taipa - Macau SAR (China)

Times Higher Education (2023) Ranking: 193th in the world and 33rd in Asia

 

利天佑

副教授(已獲特許任教資格)

全球與公共事務研究所 副主任

澳門大學 社會科學學院 政府與行政學系E21B-4051

澳門氹仔大學大馬路


domingo, 25 de fevereiro de 2024

China, de volta ao seu passado imperial sob o imperador Xi - Carl Minzner (Council on Foreign Affairs)

 Eu já chamava o Xi de imperador desde a sua recondução à liderança total pela segunda vez. No terceiro mandato é evidente que ele é mais imperador do que secretário geral do PCC. PRA

Beijing’s Ideological Pivot Back To the Past

As China turns the page from its reform era, the Chinese Communist Party's official discourse increasingly references the country's imperial past. 
Blog Post by Carl Minzner
Council on Foreign Relations, February 23, 2024 3:42 pm (EST)

https://www.cfr.org/blog/beijings-ideological-pivot-back-past

China’s official discourse is pivoting back to its imperial past. 

Since his rise to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has steadily infused his official speeches and pronouncements with an increasing number of classical Chinese idioms and historical references. Chinese state television now hosts a regular program (平“语”近人——习近平喜欢的典故) in which scholars analyze idioms and references invoked by Xi, helping to interpret classical concepts for the public and tie them to both central Party slogans and China’s current social realities. Naturally, these trends are entirely consistent with the overall direction of Party ideology, including the Party’s 2021 resolution on history, which emphasizes the need to fuse Marxism with China’s “traditional culture.”

Such uses of imperial history are not limited to current officials. After China’s former central bank governor Yi Gang stepped down from his post, his first interview in January 2023 was an extended discursive analysis of Song dynastic paper currency reforms of the late 10th century. For at least one Chinese commentator, such comments read as a careful, coded warning against government overspending and the risk of currency devaluation and inflation.

Interpreting the political rhetoric emanating from Beijing is far from a new problem—particularly as it has regularly shifted over time. During the 1950s and 60s, foreign analysts had to parse abstract Marxist formulations in the People’s Daily for signals as to which cadres had fallen into disrepute, or whether tensions with the Soviet Union were on the rise. With the birth of the reform era in the late 1970s, invocations of Western or Japanese models became de rigueur for officials seeking to promote economic or legal reform.

But the era in which it was politically acceptable to—at least publicly—frame policy proposals in China by direct comparison with desirable foreign models is drawing to a close. And a new one is dawning - one in which the increasingly preferred, and politically correct, framework will be to search China’s own past (including its own imperial and classical heritage) for the proper model or reference point. As current ideological and political trends deepen, it is quite likely that both official Chinese Party pronouncements and what careful, studied criticism of those policies can still exist in Beijing’s ever-stultifying atmosphere will be increasingly cloaked in yet deeper and deeper references to China’s own past. 

For foreign analysts and scholars of China, this will be particularly challenging. It is already hard enough figuring out what is taking place within the black box of Chinese politics, particularly as other sources of information (such as databases of academic articles and court decisions) steadily dry up. Numbers of American college students specializing in Chinese language or studies are declining; those actually studying in China now number only in the hundreds, compared with over 10,000 in the late 2010s. 

Are we really ready for an era in which our ability to appreciate complex debates over Chinese financial policies may hinge on our ability to understand how Song dynastic practices are being invoked in financial circles in Beijing? Or understand whether a given classical Chinese expression that begins to gain traction in military journals is a call for action, or restraint?