Rubens Ricupero: A Diplomacia na Construcao do Brasil: IRel-UnB, 20/11, 14h30

Aproveito para divulgar a minha resenha deste livro:

“Construindo a nação pelos seus diplomatas: resenha do livro de Rubens Ricupero”, Brasília, 27 setembro 2017, 3 p. Resenha de A diplomacia na construção do Brasil, 1750-2016 (Rio de Janeiro: Versal Editores, 2017). Encaminhada ao Estado de S. Paulo. Publicado, sob o título “O Brasil segundo a diplomacia”, na versão impressa, no jornal O Estado de S. Paulo (domingo, 8 de outubro de 2017, p. , Caderno Aliás-Política; sob o título, na versão digital, de “História da diplomacia no Brasil tem novo livro definitivo”, em 7/10/2017; link: http://alias.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,historia-da-diplomacia-no-brasil-tem-novo-livro-definitivo,70002030739). Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2017/09/cesse-tudo-o-que-musa-antiga-canta.html); novamente, depois de publicada, no blog Diplomatizzando (link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2017/10/resenha-do-livro-do-ricupero-publicada.html).

Construindo a nação pelos seus diplomatas: o paradigma Ricupero

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Em meados do século XX, os candidatos à carreira diplomática tinham uma única obra para estudar a política externa brasileira: a de Pandiá Calógeras, publicada em torno de 1930, equivocadamente intitulada A Política Exterior do Império, quando partia, na verdade, da Idade Média portuguesa e chegava apenas até a queda de Rosas, em 1852. Trinta anos depois, os candidatos passaram a se preparar pelo livro de Carlos Delgado de Carvalho, História Diplomática do Brasil, publicado uma única vez em 1959 e durante muitos anos desaparecido das livrarias e bibliotecas. No início dos anos 1990, passou a ocupar o seu lugar o livro História da Política Exterior do Brasil, da dupla Amado Cervo e Clodoaldo Bueno. Finalmente, a partir de agora uma nova obra já nasce clássica: A Diplomacia na Construção do Brasil, 1750-2016 (Rio de Janeiro: Versal, 2017, 780 p.), do embaixador Rubens Ricupero, ministro da Fazenda quando da introdução do Real, secretário-geral da Conferência das Nações Unidas para o Comércio e Desenvolvimento nos anos 1990, atualmente aposentado.

O imenso trabalho não é uma simples história diplomática, mas sim uma história do Brasil e uma reflexão sobre seu processo de desenvolvimento tal como influenciado, e em vários episódios determinado, por diplomatas que se confundem com estadistas, aliás desde antes da independência, uma vez que a obra parte da Restauração (1680), ainda antes primeira configuração da futura nação por um diplomata brasileiro a serviço do rei português: Alexandre de Gusmão, principal negociador do Tratado de Madri (1750). Desde então, diplomatas nunca deixaram de figurar entre os pais fundadores do país independente, entre os construtores do Estado, entre os defensores dos interesses no entorno regional, como o Visconde do Rio Branco, e entre os definidores de suas fronteiras atuais, como o seu filho, o Barão, já objeto de obras anteriores de Ricupero.

O Barão do Rio Branco, aliás, é um dos poucos brasileiros a ter figurado em cédulas de quase todos os regimes monetários do Brasil, e um dos raros diplomatas do mundo a se tornar herói nacional ainda em vida. Ricupero conhece como poucos outros diplomatas, historiadores ou pesquisadores acadêmicos a história diplomática do Brasil, as relações regionais e o contexto internacional do mundo ocidental desde o início da era moderna, professor que foi, durante anos, no Instituto Rio Branco e no curso de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de Brasília. Formou gerações de diplomatas e de candidatos à carreira, assim como assessorou ministros e presidentes desde o início dos anos 1960, quando foi o orador de sua turma, na presidência Jânio Quadros.

Uma simples mirada pelo sumário da obra confirma a amplitude da análise: são dezenas de capítulos, vários com múltiplas seções, em onze grandes partes ordenadas cronologicamente, de 1680 a 2016, mais uma introdução e uma décima-segunda parte sobre a diplomacia brasileira em perspectiva histórica. Um posfácio, atualíssimo, vem datado de 26 de julho de 2017, no qual ele confessa que escrever o livro foi “quase um exame de consciência... que recolhe experiências e reflexões de uma existência” (p. 744). Ricupero concluiu o texto principal pouco depois do impeachment da presidente que produziu a maior recessão da história do Brasil, e o fecho definitivo quando uma nova crise “ameaça engolir” o seu sucessor. O núcleo central da obra é composto por uma análise, profundamente embasada no conhecimento da história, dos grandes episódios que marcaram a construção da nação pela ação do seu corpo de diplomatas e dos estadistas que serviram ao Estado nessa vertente da mais importante política pública cujo itinerário – à diferença das políticas econômicas ou das educacionais – pode ser considerado como plenamente exitoso.

A diplomacia brasileira começou por ser portuguesa, mas se metamorfoseou em brasileira pouco depois, e a ruptura entre uma e outra deu-se na superação da aliança inglesa, que era a base da política defensiva de Portugal no grande concerto europeu. Já na Regência existe uma “busca da afirmação da autonomia” (p. 703), conceito que veio a ser retomado numa fase recente da política externa, mas que Ricupero demonstra existir embebido na boa política exterior do Império. A construção dos valores da diplomacia do Brasil se dá nessa época, seguido pela confiança no Direito como construtor da paz, o princípio maior seguido pelo Barão do Rio Branco em sua diplomacia de equilíbrio entre as grandes potências da sua época. Vem também do Barão a noção de que uma chancelaria de qualidade superior devia estar focada na “produção de conhecimento, a ser extraído dos arquivos, das bibliotecas, do estudo dos mapas” (p. 710). Esse contato persistente, constante, apaixonante pela história, constitui, aliás, um traço que Ricupero partilha com o Barão, o seu modelo de diplomata exemplar, objeto de uma fotobiografia que ele compôs com seu antigo chefe, o embaixador João Hermes Pereira de Araujo, com quem ele construiu o Pacto Amazônico, completando assim o arco da cooperação regional sul-americana iniciada por Rio Branco setenta anos antes.

O livro não é, como já se disse, uma simples história diplomática, mas sim um grande panorama de mais de três séculos da história brasileira, uma vez que nele, como diz Ricupero, “tentou-se jamais separar a narrativa da evolução da política externa da História com maiúscula, envolvente e global, política, social, econômica. A diplomacia em geral fez sua parte e até não se saiu mal em comparação a alguns outros setores. Chegou-se, porém, ao ponto extremo em que não mais é possível que um setor possa continuar a construir, se outros elementos mais poderosos, como o sistema político, comprazem-se em demolir. A partir de agora, mais ainda que no passado, a construção do Brasil terá de ser integral, e a contribuição da diplomacia na edificação dependerá da regeneração do todo” (p. 738-9). O paradigma diplomático já foi oferecido nesta obra; falta construir o da nação.

[Paulo Roberto de Almeida

(pralmeida@me.com)

Brasília, 27 de setembro de 2017]

Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2017/09/cesse-tudo-o-que-musa-antiga-canta.html).

EUA reconhecem a URSS em 1933 - This Day in History (NYT)

ON THIS DAY

On Nov. 16, 1933, the United States and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations. President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Soviet leader Maxim Litvinov, expressing hope that United States-Soviet relations would "forever remain normal and friendly.'' 

See this Front Page

 

 

[Permito-me citar aqui a biografia de George Kennan por John Lewis Gaddis, pois ele foi um dos arquitetos desse reconhecimento de relações diplomáticas.]

 

UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES SOVIET, EXACTING PLEDGE ON PROPAGANDA; BULLITT NAMED FIRST AMBASSADOR

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PRESIDENT REVEALS PACT

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Reads to Press Letters in Which He and Litvinoff Bind Nations.

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FREE WORSHIP CONCEDED

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Russia Also Agrees to Allow Americans Own Counsel if Brought to Trial

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WORLD PEACE IS STRESSED

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Russo-American Claims Will Be Adjusted Through Regular Diplomatic Channels.

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By WALTER DURANTY

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES

RELATED HEADLINES Trade Awaits Credits: Russians Ready to Buy $520,000,000 Goods, Says Brookhart: Arrangement Expected: Deal for $50,000,000 Cotton Likely at Start - Soviet Declared 'Good Risk': Export Guarantee Seen: Government Will Underwrite Sales, Iowan Holds - Predicts Work for 300,000 'Triumph' Hailed by Soviet People: Recognition is Likened to the Tale of the Ugly Duckling Which Became Swan: News Too Late For Fetes: Mezhlauk and Sokolnikoff Are Regarded as Candidate for Envoy to Washington Litvinoff Pledges Soviet Friendship: Looks to Cooperation With America for Peace Under Economic and Cultural Ties: Assurance on Nationals: Roosevelt Got This First, He Says in Speech - Disavows Moscow Link to Reds Here OTHER HEADLINES Flight Of Dollar Set At One Billion By London Experts: Americans' Investments in Britain in Past 3 Months Put at $375,000,000: Ban Is Disputed Here: Washington Opinion on Volume Is Divided - Dollar Rises Again in World Markets Seek A Woman Aide In Hart Abduction: Police on Coast Think She Helped in Ransom Notes to Dead Boy's Father: New Witnesses Found: Seller of 22-Pound Bricks for Murder Identifies Thurmond - Victim's Body Still in Sea Brewers Win Fight On Alcohol Label: State Board Rules They Need Not Show Strength of Beer After Repeal: Rush for Liquor Permits: 10,000 Seek Applications for Licenses for Restaurants, Hotels, and Clubs Writ Bars Tax Aid For City Subway; 5-Cent Fare Hit: Appellate Division Finds That 3 Years of Trial Operation Began Sept. 10, 1932: $12,000,000 Saving Seen: Huge Service Charge Must Be Taken From Budget if Decision is Upheld: Laguardia to Act at Once: Will Speed Negotiations as Unity Is Seen as Sole Hope of Averting Fare Rise Bolan and Aide Quell Fire in Car on 5th Avenue Roosevelt Leave for Warm Springs; Will Speak of Savannah This Morning Australia Plans to Cut Curbs on Immigration

Washington, Nov. 17--Official relations between the United States and the Soviet were established at ten minutes before midnight yesterday. Or, to express it more simply, the United States recognized the U. S. S. R. at that hour after sixteen years and nine days of the Soviet Government's existence. The fact of the establishment of relations was announced this afternoon by President Roosevelt, but historically speaking the date was 11:50 P.M., Nov. 16.
The undertakings of the two governments were set forth in eleven letters and a memorandum exchanged between the President and Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, covering agreements and concessions completed in ten days of negotiation.
Subject to the approval of the Soviet Government, William C. Bullitt of Philadelphia, special assistant to the Secretary of State, was designated to be the first American Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.
The pact read to the press by Mr. Roosevelt at his press conference this afternoon, covers propaganda, freedom of worship, protection of nationals and debts and claims.
Anti-Propaganda Pledge
The United States receives the most complete pledge against Bolshevist propaganda that has ever been made by the Soviet Government, and includes "organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from it" as well as persons or organizations under the jurisdiction or control of the government. Complete freedom of worship is assured Americans, as well as assurance against discrimination because of "ecclesiastical status."
To Americans is accorded "the right to be represented by counsel of their choice" if brought to trial in the U. S. S. R., which represented perhaps the most definite concession that M. Litvinoff made. The President made reciprocal pledges except regarding religion, which the Soviet did not desire.
Debts and claims were left to be thrashed out later for "a final settlement of the claims and counterclaims" between the governments "and the claims of their nationals." Claims arising out of the military occupation of Siberia by American forces, or assistance to military forces in Siberia after 1917, were waived, but the Murmansk occupation was not mentioned.
One may surmise that the article relating to propaganda was drawn up after the most careful consideration by the Americans of the propaganda treaties or clauses between the Soviet and Latvia and the Soviet and Afghanistan, or both, but it goes further than either of these two, and might almost be termed a diplomatic victory of high order.
The question of religious freedom has great political importance and is treated with corresponding detail. Americans are allowed everything they can want in this respect, but it is worth noting that M. Litvinoff takes the opportunity of "slipping something over" in a quiet way by quoting the laws of the Soviet Union to show that many of the reports upon the restriction of religious liberty in that country have been exaggerated.
The American side, however, scores a tactical success in M. Litvinoff's admission that "no persons having ecclesiastical status" shall be refused visas to enter the U.S.S.R. on that account.
With regard to the protection of American nationals, President Roosevelt has succeeded in obtaining one sentence which will have a considerable reverberation and cause no small heartburning in Downing Street, London, namely:
"Americans shall have the right" (if brought to trial in the U. S. S. R.) to "be represented by counsel of their choice." That sounds like something rather different from the circumstances of the Metro-Vickers trial, not to mention the earlier Shakta trial in which three Germans were involved.
In the matter of debts and claims, the honors are more evenly divided than appears at first sight. The important phrase here is "preparatory to a final settlement of the claims and counter-claims between the two governments" in the first paragraph of M. Litvinoff's letter, which to a certain extent detracts from the apparent importance of the waiving of immediate claims by the Soviet.
M. Litvinoff stated that there would be no mixed claims commission to adjust various Russo-American claims. They will all be handled through regular diplomatic channels.
It is also within the bounds of possibility that some more far-reaching agreements, at least with regard to the private debts, may be arrived at shortly, although they do not form part of the documents published today.
It is not surprising that the Russians agreed to waive a claim against the effects of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, because both in fact and intent it was far from damaging to Soviet interests. But here, too, what looks like any American victory is somewhat modified by the point that there is no reference to the American Expeditionary Force in Murmansk, which undoubtedly will provide the basis for a Soviet claim, according to the Alabama precedent.
Speaking by and large, it is probable that claims and counter-claims, so far as the two governments are concerned, and not impossibly the pre-revolution debts as well, will more or less cancel each other, whereas the American claims for money or property of American nationals seized by the Soviet will fall in another category.
President Reads Treaty
There must have been 200 newspaper men in the circular study of the Chief Executive when he made his historic announcement, and the way he did it gave an interesting illustration of the character of Franklin D. Roosevelt, his sense of drama--I hope the word "showmanship" is not "lese-majeste"--and his profound knowledge of psychology. Every one present was on tiptoe waiting for news about the result of the negotiations with M. Litvinoff.
Mr. Roosevelt smiled pleasantly at the crowd, cast an affectionate eye round the walls at his splendid collection of colored prints of old New England scenes and stated in a conventional tone that he had gratifying news from the iron and steel industry about the working of their NRA code. This he thought was important news, and it seemed, too, that there were encouraging reports along the same line from the textile industry.
It was a genuine "coup de theatre," and there was something like a gasp of suspense from his hearers.
Reporters are supposed to be toughened by their profession against surprises but, speaking personally at least, there was one of them who was startled. And the President knew it and got th full flavor of that moment of thrill.
Then quietly and calmly he proceeded to read the preamble to what is tantamount to an American-Soviet treaty.
The preamble consists of a letter from the President to the Commissar stating:
"I am very happy to inform you that as a result of our conversations, the Government of the United States has decided to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to exchange Ambassadors.
"I trust that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world."
Formal recognition was followed immediately by the designation of Mr. Bullitt as Ambassador to Russia. Hard on the heels of this announcement came publication by the State Department of the correspondence terminating the tenuous hold of representatives of the old Kerensky regime on the Russian diplomatic and consular service in this country.
No Russian Ambassador to the United States has been designated, but it is taken for granted that an announcement will be made in the very near future.
At the National Press Club this evening, while President Roosevelt was speeding toward Warm Springs, Ga., for a Thanksgiving holiday, M. Litvinoff in a brief speech and in reply to questions reviewed the negotiations for the benefit of Washington newspaper correspondents.
It is worth noting that the final phrase in the President's letter is "for the preservation of the peace of the world."
That is no formal insertion. Indeed there is hardly a word or line in the whole exchange of letters which does not merit the most careful scrutiny and attention.
M. Litvinoff replied in almost the same phrasing, and he, too, stressed the preservation of world peace which, as I cabled from Moscow, was the keynote of the first official Soviet reaction to the news of the President's message to Kalinin.
The letters cover four points of vital moment and are listed, one may presume, in the order of their importance. I venture that presumption because if ever there has been a conference in world history, and historically this conference may be found to rank among the most decisive, which really did "proceed according to plan," at least according to President Roosevelt's plan, it is this one.
You can hardly call it "an open covenant openly arrived at," that is to say, not so far as the last three words are concerned, but as a piece of "State planning," to employ the phrase familiar in Moscow and not unknown in Washington, it stands unique in post-war international events.
Put briefly, the points are propaganda, freedom of worship, protection of nationals and the question of debts and claims.
Right here there is to be noticed a most interesting point. As to propaganda, M. Litvinoff's letter comes first, expressing what the Soviet undertakes in this matter. The President's letter follows, recording, registering, and approving the said undertaking.
In the case of protection of nations, M. Litvinoff announces that certain steps shall be taken and the President assents, after which M. Litvinoff adds a short note of explanation upon the somewhat obscure question of economic espionage, which he clarifies. Once more M. Litvinoff leads in the matter of debts and claims and the President takes note of and records what he says.
To discuss the four points in detail, the propaganda letter of the Commissar contains four articles which admirably illustrate upon what a fair and reciprocal footing these negotiations have been conducted. Because, although all four articles are apparently undertakings by the Soviet, the first two are specifically things in which the United States is interested, whereas the two latter are things in which the Soviet is interested.
President Accepts Terms
The fourth article is reminiscent of a clause in the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact which referred primarily to "White Russian," or Nationalist Georgian and Ukrainian anti- Bolshevist organization.
The President's reply recapitulates the four articles, but adds significantly "it will be the fixed policy of the Executive of the United States within the limits of the powers conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States to adhere reciprocally to the engagements above expressed."
The agreement was described in informed circles as including every concession the Soviet government has ever made singly to any other country. The significant thing is that in this case the concessions are lumped into one vastly important international document--and were made prior to recognition.
To sum up, it would seem to me, with a certain knowledge of both countries, that this is one of the best and fairest international agreements I have ever read because it has a solid basis of mutual understanding and respect.
If one wants to estimate the "horse trade," I should say M. Litvinoff has got perhaps a shade the worst of it, but on the other hand, to vary the metaphor, M. Litvinoff is taking home a pretty fat turkey for Thanksgiving.
And don't forget that there is no mention of future credits and business in these documents, save rather vague allusions to consular conventions, and so forth. It is absurd to suppose that such subjects have not been discussed and may lead to great mutual benefits.
There are other points of international and political interest which have perhaps been covered. The negotiations have taken ten days, and, without being oversanguine, it may happen that, in view of the gravity of the issues involved in this moment of international confusion, general perplexity and danger, too, some future historian will term them "ten days that steadied the world."
 

Book review: Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia, 1620-1720, by Xing Hang

Published by EH.Net (November 2017)

Xing Hang,  

Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620-1720. 

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. xii + 332 pp. $100 (hardback), ISBN: 978-1-107-12184-3.

Reviewed for EH.Net by François Gipouloux, CNRS, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.

This book by Xing Hang (assistant professor of history at Brandeis University) follows the trends of recent scholarship on maritime history. (For example, Li Kangying on Ming maritime policy, Zhao Gang on Qing relations with the seas, David Dahpon Ho on the Qing maritime frontier and Tonio Andrade on Taiwan). It is also a brilliant addition to prior work by John Wills, Patrizia Carioti on Zheng Chenggong, as well as Paola Calanca on smugglers and pirates on the Fujian coast.

The book is a contribution to the economic history of an empire’s periphery (China’s south-eastern coast and Taiwan), but at the same time offers a thoughtful view of the diplomatic and military aspects of the Ming-Qing transition. The book also covers the background of the world’s first globalization: how China interacted with other polities, how the Zhengs were able to challenge the financial power of great actors like the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and how the East Asian region began to integrate into a nascent world system.

Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia is an enjoyable read. It covers four generations of the Zheng family, roughly from the early sixteenth century through to the fall of Taiwan to the Qing, in 1683. The book is divided into eight chapters. Three appendixes provide a wide range of quantitative data regarding the volume of the overseas trade managed by the Zheng clan. Appendix 3, in particular, includes very detailed figures of Zheng trade at Nagasaki, which surpassed VOC trade during the 1650-1662 period.

Hang has tapped into a large number of sources, ranging from memoirs, Zheng documents from private collections and Qing archives, along with Dutch, English, Japanese, Korean and Spanish historical records, and inscriptions collected during field work in Fujian. The merit of Hang’s work is that he gathers together a large number of previously disconnected elements in Chinese and Western scholarship, including intra-Asiatic economic changes, military issues, ideological frameworks and business techniques, and he has thus drawn a very complete picture of an autonomous polity, at the periphery of the Chinese empire during the Ming-Qing transition. This was an exuberant periphery, which grew swiftly within the context of the conflict between Ming loyalists and Qing conquerors.

In seventeenth century East Asia, there occurred simultaneously a great, structured expansion of foreign powers and a transition in China’s role in international trade. Hang guides us through a changing geopolitical environment in which the collapse of the southern Ming imposed a complete redirection of economic flows with the emergence of the Indian subcontinent as a prominent silk producer. The Zheng trading organization proved well adapted to the change China underwent in the 1650s, moving from a producer of luxury goods to an importer and processor of raw materials and setting up of a circuit involving Indian textiles and Southeast Asian raw materials in exchange for Japanese silver and Chinese gold.

For a readership focusing on economic history, Chapter 3, “Between Trade and Legitimacy,” is certainly the most thought provoking. The Zheng family amassed huge amounts of wealth that were managed by several firms operating deep in Qing controlled territory, They were able to procure silk, porcelain and other luxury products for the Xiamen warehouse, and reported to their headquarters in Hangzhou from their branches in Suzhou, Nanjing and even Beijing. These firms also served as centers for gathering intelligence on Qing military operations. The “five mountains firms” were also able to supervise the construction of commercial and military seagoing junks. Their operating area was divided, as it was during the Ming Dynasty, into Eastern and Western oceans. Official merchants (guan shang) worked under the Zheng family according to a sophisticated hierarchy consisting of, on the one hand, adopted sons of the clan’s relatives and military commanders and, on the other hand, independent merchants linked to the clan by long-term debts contracted by borrowing capital or ships to trade on behalf of the Zheng organization.

Hang claims that in the 1650s, the Zheng trading network bore all the characteristics of a maritime empire, within the limits of an intra-Asiatic area, stretching from the markets in Japan (Nagasaki), Dutch Taiwan (VOC) and Manila, with extensions to Vietnam and Ayuttaya (Siam), where they dealt with Muslim traders from Bengal and the Coromandel Coast. Within the framework of the limited autonomy of cities or territories in Asia and the impossibility for patrician communities to formalize their own legal arrangements, the patron-client relationship was the cornerstone of any successful and long-lasting business operation in China. The Zheng were no exception. Until his death in 1662, Koxinga adhered to this pattern and reshaped the framework of international relationships and rudimentary bureaucracy of the Ming Dynasty.

The pervasive role that Confucian orthodoxy and filial piety played in this arduous attempt to restore Ming legitimacy is aptly emphasized in this book. What is also striking is the economic contribution of “ideological purity” combined with hard economic realities. However, outright loyalty to the Ming Dynasty did not prevent the Zhengs from protecting their own interests. Hang also carefully analyses the merchants’ double allegiance to the Zheng clan and to European traders and the way they served as channels for communication between them. In the late 1660s, rivalry with the Dutch over silk escalated in Japan and, although merchants could trade freely in the areas under his control, Zheng Jing maintained a strict monopoly on strategic goods (silk, deerskins and sugar).

How should we interpret the integration of the first global network of trade, which brought together the demand for China’s silk and high quality goods with an insatiable thirst for silver? From Zheng Zhilong to Zheng Chenggong, the activities of the trading network evolved from a centralized piratical organization to an informal state. At the time he was consolidating his power (1650), Koxinga possessed several hundred war junks and was able to mobilize 40,000 soldiers. At the same time, he envisioned the highest possible autonomy and sought to establish control over the three south-eastern provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong, as well as a 13,000 km long coastline in exchange for his support of Ming restoration. Xing Hang vividly describes the long process of negotiations between the Zheng clan and the Qing, which started as early as 1653 and continued, with interspersed episodes of war, diplomacy and neutrality, until the final conquest of Taiwan in 1683.

Xing Hang’s book documents in detail the extent of Zheng Chenggong’s power at sea. He was able to set up an efficient maritime blockade on Luzon and Dutch Taiwan until the Governor General of Manila gave in and submitted. The Dutch in Taiwan were pressured to soften their position. On the mainland, Koxinga was also able to launch a military expedition (although ultimately defeated), with over a thousand junks and 100,000 soldiers, into the Yangzi River delta. Even after his unsuccessful attack on Nanjing in 1659, Koxinga still maintained control over China’s coastline, from Zhejiang to Fujian.

On the diplomatic front, Zheng Chenggong made several attempts to convince the bakufu to support his military efforts against the Qing. Koxinga’s grand military strategy was two-fold. First of all, he sought to seize the resource rich Yangzi River delta in order to solve his organization’s needs for food and supplies and, at the same time, to take control of primary production of silk and other luxuries. Secondly, he planned an invasion of Dutch Taiwan and Spanish controlled Manila (in 1670 and 1672). The invasion of Taiwan was a consequence of Koxinga’s defeat at Nanking. The takeover of Manila, although poorly defended, never occurred. This overseas expansion, if it had been successful, would have led to the foundation of a maritime China encompassing a huge trading network stretching from Japan to Southeast Asia and able to defy the continental Qing Empire.

Another merit of this book is that it sheds new light on Koxinga’s son, Zheng Jing and on how he achieved, within two decades, the Zheng organization’s transformation into a viable territorial state, with the creation of a sophisticated administration, the rationalization of the kinship networks of southern Fujian and a greater economic diversification. This efficient policy attracted refugees reduced to starvation by the Qing coastal evacuation policy. Xing Hang meticulously describes the power game which led to the ascendancy of Zheng Jing and the diplomatic and military interaction between the VOC, Shi Lang (the former commander who defected to the Qing in 1651 and head of the Qing naval command), and Japan, whose neutral stance adopted in the 1660s complicated the consolidation of the position of Ming loyalists.

The final reason for the Zheng’s failure lies more in the growing competitiveness from the Bengal and Indonesian-based Dutch, a rising East India Company and Southeast Asian trading networks to which the Zheng organisation began to lose market shares, rather than in Qing military offensives and blockades against the island of Taiwan.

François Gipouloux, Emeritus Research Director, National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), China, Korea, Japan Research Centre, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, is the coordinator of the International Research Network The Globalisation’s Origins and the Great Divergence: Trading Networks and the Trajectory of Economic Institutions — Europe-Asia, 1500-2000. He is the author of The Asian Mediterranean: Port Cities and Trading Networks in China, Japan and Southeast Asia, 13th-21st century, Edward Elgar, 2011.

Copyright (c) 2017 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (November 2017). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://www.eh.net/BookReview.